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ABSTRACT
The purpose o f this study was to analyze variables that potentially affect 
taxpayers' attitudes about income tax compliance. Phase one o f the study focused on the 
relationships between four groups o f variables and ethical perceptions o f compliance 
behaviors. The four groups o f variables follow: demographic variables such as age. 
education, and household income; personal characteristic variables such as idealism, 
relativism, conservatism, and religiosity; situational variables including an overall attitude 
about paying federal income taxes and impressions o f the effectiveness o f a number o f 
law changes intended to make the IRS more responsive; and. consequential variables 
comprised o f five dimensions o f moral intensity, expectations o f audit, and additional IRS 
assessments. Phase two of the study focused on the relationship between ethical 
perceptions and expected compliance behaviors.
The study sample was drawn from responses to a national survey o f 3,109 
individuals selected randomly throughout the United States. The primary analytical 
technique employed was hierarchical regression.
The results o f phase one were mixed. No support was found with respect to 
demographic variables. Regarding personal characteristics, limited support was found 
with respect to both conservatism and religiosity. Among the situational variables, partial 
support was identified for two o f the tax law changes—extension, in some circumstances,
iii
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of the attorney/client privilege, and creation of a fund to support tax clinics for low- 
income earners. Regarding the consequential variables, while strong support was found 
for social consensus, only limited support was found for probability of harm, seriousness 
o f consequences, and proximity. With regard to the results o f phase two, strong support 
was identified for the relationship between ethical perceptions and expected compliance 
behaviors.
The relationship between the above variables and tax compliance behavior has not 
previously been analyzed. Accordingly, the study contributes to the literature by 
identifying several characteristics and situations that, to varying degrees, affect ethical 
perceptions and expected compliance behaviors.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
Introduction
With the passage o f  the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution o f the United 
States in 1913, Federal income tax became a part o f everyday life for most Americans. 
Since that time, many provisions o f the Internal Revenue Code have been added and 
frequently revised. Today, individual income tax is by far the largest revenue generator 
for the Federal government (Pratt and Kulsrud 1997).
Since the introduction o f the Federal income tax, there have been frequent 
challenges to the constitutionality o f income tax laws by various groups of people 
generally referred to as tax protesters. Until recent years these protests were thought to 
have no merit and were little more than a nuisance to the Federal government.
However, beginning with the introduction o f the alternative minimum tax in 1969 
and continuing through 1997 there have been multiple layers o f rules and regulations 
added to the body of tax legislation. This on-going trend of more and more complexity 
in the tax laws to which the general public was expected to comply may have led to 
changes in attitudes towards the Federal income tax system and the likelihood that the
1
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current system will continue to meet the needs o f both the individuals expected to comply 
and the Internal Revenue Service, which was expected to monitor that compliance.
That the increased complexity has taken its toll on both the taxpaying public and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was evidenced by recent congressional hearings into 
abuses by the IRS. These abuses were apparently aimed at the segment of society least 
able to defend itself—the lower income working class unable to afford the professional 
representation necessary to defend themselves against an IRS that had tremendous latitude 
in dealing with perceived noncompliance. The magnitude o f noncompliance was at best 
a guess; however, estimates have placed the size of the gap between the amount taxpayers 
owed and what they voluntarily paid for 1992 at $127 billion dollars (Internal Revenue 
Service 1990).
Underreporting of income and/or overreporting o f deductions were not surprising 
in light o f the many sweeping changes to income tax laws in recent years. As Congress 
debated yet another major tax revision in 1995, the taxpayers, professional preparers, and 
even the Internal Revenue Service were still digesting the ten major tax bills passed in the 
previous fourteen years (Miller 1995).
The fact that the government was beginning to at least hear the public outcry was 
evident from recent steps taken by Congress and the Internal Revenue Service. In 1996, 
the IRS awarded contracts to five private collection agencies to collect Federal taxes from 
individuals and businesses. Congress participated in this enterprise by appropriating $ 13 
million dollars and mandating a pilot program of using private law firms and debt 
collection agencies to boost tax collections (Journal o f Accountancy 1996). The Internal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3Revenue Service had set a goal to increase taxpayer compliance from 82.3% to 90% by 
the year 2001(Federal Managers Quarterly 1994). In testimony before the U. S. Senate 
Small Business Committee, Robert Grille, President o f the National Society o f Public 
Accountants, emphasized the confusion the general public faces regarding the current tax 
system and admonished Congress to be straight with the public regarding possible reform 
(The National Public Accountant 1995).
Tax laws have become so intricate that even accountants, attorneys, and the IRS 
have difficulty interpreting many of the Internal Revenue Code’s provisions. The 
complexity has become so great that some reform proposals called for the complete 
abandonment o f the income tax system (Carnes and Cuccia 1996). Carnes and Cuccia 
(1996) also, however, found that taxpayers were willing to accept complexity in 
circumstances that required complexity. Bill Archer, a congressman from Texas had 
made suggestions to . . .  “tear the income tax system out by its roots” (Miller 1995, p. 
66). The pressure to respond to the loud outcry by the American public had even reached 
the President o f the United States. In a monumental reversal o f position. President 
Clinton endorsed a congressional plan to reform the Internal Revenue Service. Mike 
McCurry, a Presidential spokesman, said the administration "Would rather be on the boat 
sailing from the dock than waving from the shore” (USA Today 1997, p. 1). This 
response apparently reflected the political reality that the average taxpayer is dissatisfied.
In September, 1997, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings regarding 
abusive procedures by the Internal Revenue Service. In one session, six current and 
former IRS employees testified and were questioned about abusive tactics oflen used by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4IRS personnel. Specifically, the focus was on retaliatory treatment o f employees who 
attempted to report wrongdoing. Reports of inappropriate behavior o f IRS supervisors 
were, apparently, met with more examination o f the employee reporting the wrongdoing 
than o f the alleged actions o f the supervisor. The main line o f questioning by the Senate 
committee seemed to be directed at the ability o f the IRS to police itself.
Earlier in the same session, the Finance Committee heard testimony from four 
individuals who had experienced abusive treatment by the IRS even after it became 
apparent that the IRS position was an incorrect one. Questioning focused on the lack of 
appropriate responses by the IRS when it became obvious that mistakes had been made. 
Other than litigation, which can be very expensive, no mechanism, independent o f the IRS 
itself, existed for taxpayers to redress their grievances.
Based, in part, on this series of testimonies, Congress enacted the “Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act o f 1998." The primary goal o f the 
legislation was to make the IRS provide better service through less contact with taxpayers 
(IRC 7802).
Purpose o f the Research 
The purpose of this study was to analyze factors that potentially affect taxpayers' 
attitudes toward current income tax compliance and the Internal Revenue Service. 
Understanding gained through this study should be helpful to tax preparers, tax 
consultants, the Internal Revenue Service, and lawmakers in improving taxpayer 
compliance or reforming the existing tax structure. Knowledge of taxpayers' attitudes
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5toward compliance should be helpful to preparers and consultants in managing client 
relations given the uncertainty o f the administration o f the existing tax system. 
Lawmakers and the Internal Revenue Service should benefit from such knowledge in 
designing programs to increase compliance.
The study surveyed a cross-section of individuals throughout the United States 
using a questionnaire to assess the characteristics o f the respondents, their ethical 
perceptions, and behavioral intentions. The survey instrument included several 
measurement instruments validated by prior research. The survey relied heavily on 
individual characteristics, situational or environmental factors, and measures o f  moral 
intensity. Hierarchical regression was used to examine the relationship among ethical 
perceptions and other factors that might affect taxpayer behavior.
Objectives o f the Research 
The primary purpose of this research was to identify factors that might influence 
taxpayers' attitudes about paying taxes. One major objective was to determine whether 
these factors had an influence on behavioral intentions and to determine if these factors 
explained why some taxpayers were more inclined than others to engage in 
noncompliance activities.
This research examined personal characteristics, situational factors, and 
consequential factors that might affect ethical perceptions. The personal characteristics 
were idealism, relativism, conservatism, and religiosity. Situational factors examined 
were existing attitudes about paying federal income taxes and perceptions o f the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6effectiveness o f seven o f the tax law changes intended to make the Internal Revenue 
Service more responsive to taxpayers. Consequential factors examined included five 
dimensions o f  moral intensity: probability o f  harm, seriousness o f consequences, social 
consensus, temporal immediacy, and proximity, along with taxpayers’ perceptions o f  the 
likelihood o f being audited and, if audited, the likelihood o f paying additional 
assessments.
A related objective was to determine if taxpayers viewed noncompliance as an 
ethical issue. If so, to what degree did they view certain situations as ethical issues? Did 
the threat o f being caught intensify the moral imperativeness? Did feelings about paying 
taxes in general affect ethical perceptions o f  noncompliance? Did changes made to the 
operations o f the IRS in recently enacted legislation affect perceptions o f  tax compliance?
Did ethical perceptions about tax compliance affect behavioral intentions?
The “Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act o f  1998” was passed 
in early 1998. Since filing income tax returns was an annual process, taxpayers had not 
gained adequate experience dealing with the IRS under the new laws to develop attitudes 
based on experiences. However, if the initial impressions o f taxpayers regarding those 
changes were favorable, compliance might be positively affected by these impressions?
Accordingly, another objective o f this study was to analyze the relationship, if  any, 
between those impressions and behavioral intentions.
This study also examined the demographics o f survey subjects to determine if 
certain o f the identified factors were more common to specific subgroups o f the study 
population based on such factors as age, geographic region, attained educational level,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7gender, career, or prior experience with the IRS. Factors and demographics identified in 
the study could be useful to any of the groups that deal with taxpayers including 
professional tax preparers or consultants and the Internal Revenue Service. Specifically 
the information could be useful in framing future reforms to the existing tax system.
Significance o f the Research 
This study provided incremental information that may help to explain taxpayer 
behavior. The issues of income tax complexities have been debated for years. In 1943, 
Harry Simons referred to the income tax system as insufferably complicated and nearly 
unintelligible. His view was that if the system was not simplified, half o f the population 
might have to become tax lawyers and tax accountants (Simons 1950). That the system 
was complex was not in question in this study. Rather, the study focused on factors that 
influence taxpayers' attitudes and behavioral intentions, which in turn may affect their 
behaviors. Knowledge of taxpayers' attitudes and behavioral intentions could be helpful 
to Congress in enacting future legislation. Also o f concern was whether taxpayers viewed 
noncompliance as an important ethical issue. A possible topic o f discussion in framing 
such future legislation is whether to reform the existing income tax system or replace the 
entire income tax system with some other form o f tax revenue.
Plan o f Study
Factors that may explain differences in taxpayers' perceptions and behavioral 
intentions were examined in this study. Literature related to the perceived complexities 
o f the current tax system as well as literature focused on taxpayer and tax practitioners’
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8behaviors were reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 outlined the research design, itemizing 
the various hypotheses, measures, sources o f data, and the methodology used in the 
analysis. This chapter also described the various psychometric measures utilized in the 
survey. Chapter 4 summarized the results o f the research. Chapter 5 presented the overall 
conclusions and contributions of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction
Explaining and understanding observed patterns of noncompliance with regard to 
income taxes is of obvious importance not only to the United States government but to 
governments around the world. Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) argue that finding 
ways to reduce noncompliance is of paramount importance in any study of noncompliant 
behavior. Some studies use the tax gap, the difference between Federal income taxes 
actually owed and the amount voluntarily reported and paid on a timely basis, as a 
measure of the magnitude of tax evasion. For the years 1973 through 1992 the size of the 
tax gap rose from an estimated $22.7 billion to about $127 billion (Internal Revenue 
Service 1990, 1996). Noteworthy is the fact that this rise coincides with a substantial 
increase in total tax liability during the same period.
Factors that may affect compliance include the concepts of equity, efficiency, and 
incidence. For example, if the rich can evade a proportionately larger share o f taxes than 
the poor, the tax system will be perceived as inequitable. If tax evasion becomes 
significant, the effective tax rate on reported income will necessarily be higher to satisfy
9
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a need for a fixed level of revenue. The result would be to place a heavier burden on 
those who comply voluntarily (Andreoni et al. 1998).
Tax evasion by its very nature is difficult to measure. However, the Internal 
Revenue Service attempted to develop reliable information on underreporting of income 
through the use o f the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). This 
program developed information about compliance by using extremely rigorous income 
tax audits aimed at identifying areas of noncompliance rather than the collection of taxes 
on unreported income or excess deductions. The detailed nature of these audits placed 
a disproportionate cost of compliance on those taxpayers randomly selected for TCMP 
audits; accordingly, Congress mandated an end to the program in 1997. The program was 
not successful in detecting significant unreported taxes on types of income not subject to 
informational reporting. It did develop statistics on detectable underreporting of income 
subject to various forms of informational reporting and on abuses of allowable 
deductions. From the most recent year of TCMP audits, 1998, the IRS reported that 40 
percent of households underpay their income taxes, 53 percent pay correctly, and 7 
percent overpay their liability. In a study of taxpayer compliance, Andreoni et al. (1998) 
discovered that about one-fourth of those who underpay do so by at least $1500.
TCMP audits were also used to develop grading procedures to estimate the audit 
potential o f  tax returns filed. Using a system called discriminant function (DIF), points 
were assigned each return based on the perceived likelihood that an audit of the return 
will result in additional taxes. The system assessed the variance of each line-item from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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some predetermined norm. In order to protect the integrity of the system, specifics of 
assessment were a closely guarded secret.
Compliance Behaviors 
The Internal Revenue Service had frequently used TCMP to attempt to distinguish 
returns of those taxpayers who report the appropriate amount of income from those who 
do not. For 1992, estimates were that 91.7 percent of all income which should have been 
reported was, in fact, reported. Some commentators speculate that an overestimation of 
the probability of audit contributes to the apparent honesty. Variables that have been 
studied may be grouped into a number of categories; demographics, social issues, framing 
of research, and IRS practices (see Table 1).
Demographics
In a recent study, Andreoni et al. (1998) identified the following patterns of 
noncompiiance:
(1) Income from sources subject to informational reporting such as W-2’s and 
K.-1 ’s was usually reported correctly.
(2) Income from other sources such as farm income and sole-proprietorship 
income was often understated.
(3) Married taxpayers had higher than average levels of noncompliance. 
Perhaps taxpayers react to the “marriage penalty”. Tax brackets for married
individuals and single filers are different. While the married rates are somewhat more 
favorable when couples file jointly, the differential is not adequate to offset the stacking
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1. Summary of Compliance Studies
12
Variable 
S tu d ^ ^ ^  
Demographics
Andreoni, Erard, 
and Feinstein 
(1998)
^ajoH Findings
Compilation o f other Type of income affects compliance rate 
study results
Compliance rate higher among married 
taxpayers
Compliance rate higher among taxpayers 
over 65
Noncompliance increases burden on 
taxpayers who comply
Wilson and 
Patterson (1968)
Truett (1990) 
Feinstein (1991)
U. S. General 
Accounting Office
(1990)
Dubin and Wilde 
(1998)
Baldry (1987)
New Zealanders
A ARP members 
twins
IRS Taxpayer 
Compliance 
Program Data
TCMP data
TCMP data and 
census data
TCMP data and 
census data
Conservatism  increases substantially  
during individuals fifth decade o f  life
and Conservatism increases substantially 
during individuals fifth decade o f  life
Rate and magnitude of noncompliance less 
in households with taxpayer over 65
Type of income affects compliance rates
Noncompliance greatest in areas where 
non-white populations greatest
Age and gender affect compliance rates
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Table 1 -  Continued
Variable 
Study 
Social Issues
Grasmick and 
Bursick (1990)
Spicer and Becker 
(1980)
Smith (1992)
Aim,Jackson, and 
McKee
Webley (1991)
Harris and 
Associates. Inc. 
(1987)
Yankelovich. 
Skelly, and 
White, Inc. (1984)
Hite (1988)
Collins Milliron 
and Toy (1992)
Engel and Hines 
(1994)
Nigrini (1996)
Sample Major Findings
Adult taxpayers Guilt and shame affect compliance rates
57 college students Taxpayers who are told their burden is 
relatively higher evade tax more 
frequently than those told their burden is 
lower
Those who believed tax dollars well spent 
had higher compliance rates
Compliance rates are higher for those who 
believe they benefitted from public good 
funded by taxes
follow-up survey of People with positive attitude about 
prior experiment government have higher compliance rates
Adult taxpayers
Controlled group 
experiment
participants 
National poll
Opinion poll
Mail survey
700 Households in 
NE and SW states
Tax filers with 
prior audit 
experience
One-fourth o f taxpayers do not take 
deductions or credits to which they are 
entitled
One-half o f taxpayers believe enforcement 
is inconsistent
Knowledge o f peer behavior affects 
willingness to take questionable deduction
High correlation between knowledge o f 
peers behavior and noncompliance
Compliance rates not correlated to past 
audit experience
IRS Individual Tax Statistical procedures not consistent in 
^ o d e jJF ile s^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e te c tin ^ n m ic o m g lia n c e  activities
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Table 1 -  Continued
14
Variable
Study Sample Major Findings
Framine of Research
White, Harrison, 
and Harrell 
(1993)
Adult taxpayers Taxpayers expecting refund less likely to 
claim unsubstantiated deduction than ones 
expecting to owe taxes upon filing
Schadewaled
(1989)
MBA students Taxpayers expecting refund less likely to 
take an aggressive position
Schepanski
(1990)
Three groups 
randomly assign, to 
different framing 
conditions
Risk preferences altered by changing ones 
perception o f outcomes -  tax due 
compared to net liability
Reckers and 
Sanders
Arkansas 
Household 
Research Panel
Withholding status relative to tax liability 
affects expected behaviors
IRS Practices
Long and 
Schwartz (1987)
TCMP data two 
separate years
Audit experience has no effect on 
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of two incomes. Inclusion o f two incomes on one return has the effect o f taxing one o f 
the incomes in a higher bracket than if it were included on a separate return. The system 
does not allow married individuals to choose to file as single. The alternative to joint 
filing is to file in a status called “married filing separate.” a status with the least favorable 
rates.
The parameter of 65 years o f age may be used because it is one o f the few pieces 
of demographic information included on individual tax returns. It is possible that age is 
a surrogate for conservatism. A study published in 1968 found a significant increase in 
conservatism in the fifth decade o f individuals' lives (Wilson and Patterson 1968). 
Without a follow-up study, the increase in conservatism observed for that age-group at 
that time might have been a cohort effect-one caused by a significant event that was 
common to all the study groups. Such an effect might be, say, the age-group showing the 
increased conservatism all experienced the effects of World War II. The finding, 
however, was duplicated by Truett (1993). Identifying a significant increase in 
conservatism in the 40’s age group twenty-five years after the earlier study suggests that 
increased conservatism is not attributable to some cohort effect. Possibly increased 
conservatism accounts for the higher compliance rate among taxpayers over 65.
Still other studies have attempted to find a correlation between compliance rates 
and factors such as audit rates and penalties. Despite relatively low rates o f  audits, less 
than one percent, and infrequently applied penalties, compliance is fairly high-only about 
17 percent o f taxes go uncollected (Andreoni et al. 1998).
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Studies o f  the effects o f demographic and social factors on income tax compliance 
rates are hampered by an absence o f data. Tax returns contain little demographic 
information. Some researchers comb information developed through the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measure Program (TCMP) for some insight into factors that may identify 
taxpayers who are likely to engage in noncompliance. Others use creative ways to 
indirectly identify significant demographic factors.
By controlling for factors such as level of income and marginal tax rates, Feinstein
(1991) found that both the rate and magnitude of noncompliance were less in households 
in which either the head of the household or the spouse was over 65. He also found that 
both rate and magnitude were higher in households in which the head o f  the household 
was married. Data from TCMP audits found differences in noncompliance rates across 
occupations. The United States General Accounting Office (1990) looked at 
noncompliance rates among sole-proprietorships. The highest rates of noncompliance 
were among taxpayers whose businesses were operated from fixed locations such as car 
dealers, stores, and restaurants--about 39 percent. Other occupations, including 
transportation, communication, and utilities were somewhat lower at 31 percent. The 
lowest rates o f noncompliance were found among business filers engaged in finance, real 
estate, and insurance activities, as well as taxpayers in agriculture, forestry, and fishing- 
all falling in the 16-19 percent range.
Attempts to indirectly measure demographic effects on compliance actions include 
a novel study merging census data with TCMP findings based on a three-digit zip code 
level. Results o f such a study were necessarily imprecise, but generalized conclusions
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could be drawn. Dubin and Wilde (1998) found that voluntary compliance rates were 
greatest in areas in which non-white populations were lowest and in areas in which the 
over 65 populations were highest. This result is consistent with the Andreoni et al. (1998) 
study that found that taxpayers over sixty-five were more likely to voluntarily comply. 
Examinations o f unemployment rates and percentages o f the adult population with high 
school diplomas were inconclusive. Experimental studies also targeted age and gender 
as possible explanatory variables in the study of compliance rates. Age in particular was 
found to be positively associated with compliance rates. On the other hand, males evaded 
taxes more often than females (Baldry 1987).
Social Issues
Some researchers believed prior audit experiences affected tax compliance. Long 
and Schwartz (1987) compared results o f TCMP audits in 1969 and surprise follow-up 
TCMP audits in 1971 of the same taxpayers. They found that the earlier audit experience 
had only marginal effect on frequency of noncompliance and no effect at all on magnitude 
o f noncompliance.
Moral issues may affect behavior in meeting filing requirements. For example, 
filers may experience guilt when contemplating evasion while expecting not to be caught. 
On the other hand they may experience shame when contemplating underreporting and 
considering the possibility of getting caught. Grasmick and Bursick (1990) found that 
incorporating these concepts into their model improved the predictability o f behavior.
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Perceptions o f unfairness may lead to rationalization for noncompliance. 
Taxpayers may believe the system itself is unfair to them in relation to others. They may 
also believe that as a result o f tax evasion the burden on those who comply, compared to 
those who do not, is disproportionate. Spicer and Becker (1980) found such an effect in 
an experimental study. Taxpayers who were told that their tax burdens were relatively 
higher evaded taxes in greater amounts than those taxpayers told that their tax burdens 
were lower.
Satisfaction with the government affects compliance decisions. Smith (1992) 
found that taxpayers who believed tax dollars were not well spent felt cheated and might, 
therefore, refuse to pay their full liability. Individuals who perceived that they receive 
benefits from a public good funded by taxes were more willing to comply (Aim, Jackson, 
and McKee 1992). Along the same lines, taxpayers who felt alienated from government 
or had a negative attitude in general toward laws were significantly more likely to engage 
in evasive practices (Webley 1991).
Over half of taxpayers get tax advice, believing that taxes are too complicated to 
handle themselves. About one-fourth o f all taxpayers report not taking a deduction or 
credit to which they believed they were entitled (Harris and Associates, Inc. 1987). About 
half o f taxpayers believed that enforcement was inconsistent across audits (Yankelovich, 
Skelly, and White 1984). Problems arising from complexity, real or perceived, were not 
limited to taxpayers. Tax laws may also be too complicated for IRS auditors and various 
judges to properly administer. Lack o f adequate understanding of the laws leads to 
inconsistent application. Some noncompliance went undetected while some returns
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thought to be compliant were assessed additional taxes along with penalties. Such 
uncertainty discouraged taxpayers from taking deductions to which they were entitled 
(Andreoni et al. 1998).
Hite (1988) considered knowledge of peer behavior in compliance as a significant 
effect on taxpayers’ willingness to take questionable deductions or underreport income. 
She hypothesized that knowing others engaged in noncompliance behavior was a 
substantial determinant of a taxpayer’s propensity to engage in similar activities. Her 
research, however, did not support the hypothesis. Other factors, such as age, gender, 
penalties, mobility, and type of income, exerted greater influence over noncompliance. 
In fact, type o f income was the most substantial factor in the decision. Specifically barter 
income was more likely to be underreported than cash income. Also an individual’s own 
past behavior was a significant indicator of future behavioral intent. A taxpayer who had 
underreported income in the past was more likely to under report income again than one 
who has not done so.
Contrary to Hite’s research, Collins, Milliron, and Toy (1992) found a high 
correlation between a taxpayer's knowledge of a peer’s noncompliance action and his own 
noncompliance. On the other hand, Engel and Hines (1994) found that cumulative 
compliance effects, ones based on past reporting and audit experiences, were situational 
in nature and required simulations (scenarios) to predict behavior. Complexity was also 
an influential factor in the determination of behavioral intent. One of the difficulties in 
studying the influence o f peer behavior was that the subjects only knew what their peers 
claimed to do since filing a tax return was a private matter.
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Nigrini (1996) used Benford’s law regarding the frequency o f appearance o f 
certain digits to detect tax evasion. For this study, tax evasion was broken down between 
planned evasion and unplanned evasion. Planned evasion was defined as intentionally 
concealing an audit trail to avoid paying taxes. On the other hand, unplanned evasion was 
the blatant manipulation of specific line items on the return at the time o f filing. Only 
unplanned evasion was thought to be detectable using Benford’s Law. The results 
showed limited support for the use of this statistical technique. There were some excess 
frequencies o f low digits in reporting interest income, with some excess frequencies o f 
high digits in reporting interest expense. However, the technique was not of general use 
because many lines on tax returns were subject to various dollar or percentage limitations 
or other distortions that produced unusual digital frequency distributions.
Framing o f Research
Framing o f the circumstances surrounding the decision regarding noncompliance 
was thought to have an effect on the ultimate behavioral intentions. White, Harrison, and 
Harrel (1993) hypothesized in their research that taxpayers expecting to owe amounts due 
at the time o f filing their returns more frequently claimed unsubstantiated deductions than 
those expecting a refund. They also believed that as audit detection rates increased, 
taxpayers were less likely to take unsubstantiated deductions. Both hypotheses were 
supported.
As was noted in other studies, the framing o f  circumstances surrounding the 
decision to take a questionable position on a return was significant to the action taken.
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As in similar studies, Schadewald (1989) found support for the concept that a taxpayer 
expecting a refund was less likely to take an aggressive position than someone expecting 
to pay taxes with the filing o f the tax return. Labeling possible outcomes with terms such 
as “gains” and “losses” significantly affected the decision to take an aggressive position. 
Schadewald speculated that there was a natural tendency to view all tax consequences as 
“losses”. Therefore, labeling possible results in other terms (such as “gains”) affected the 
research outcomes. Because o f this self-labeling effect, Schadewald believed prospect 
theory was o f little importance in describing compliance behaviors. Prospect theory was 
defined as “choice under uncertainty.”
Schadewald's conclusions were questioned by Schepanski and Kelsey (1990). 
The subjects in this study were asked whether they would report the correct amount due 
or take advantage of evasion opportunities when possible outcomes and related 
probabilities were given. Schepanski etal. (1990) found that individuals' risk preferences 
were altered by changing their perceptions o f the outcomes. In this instance, the 
differences in outcomes were described alternately in terms of taxes due (cash flow) or 
cash position (net asset) afier filing a return.
Since the United States has a voluntary tax compliance system, individuals' 
propensities not to comply significantly affects the collection o f taxes. Intentional 
noncompliance has become a pervasive problem. In their research Reckers, Sanders, and 
Roark (1990) acknowledged the prior findings o f other researchers that withholding status 
relative to tax liability (expected refund or tax due with filing) and marginal tax rates 
(high versus low) were significant factors in determining compliance behavior. They
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posited, however, that these factors were also affected by ethical attitudes. The results of 
their work indicated that withholding status, tax rates, and ethical attitudes were all 
significant in determining behavior, but tax rates only marginally so. Ethical attitudes had 
a high interaction effect with withholding effects, but very little with rate effects.
IRS Practices
At least one study focused on the influence o f perceived past injustices by the 
agency charged with the administration o f the tax, the Internal Revenue Service, as a 
factor in attitudes regarding noncompliance. The perceived injustice might be one 
experienced directly by the taxpayer or one experienced vicariously by learning of 
another's negative experience with the tax collecting authority. A recent study examined 
three factors that might affect attitudes regarding noncompliance—inaccuracies o f  IRS 
assessments, inconsistency in audit frequencies, and indirect equity (anecdotal evidence 
o f others’ negative experiences). No correlation was found in the inaccuracy 
manipulation except for a slight correlation when the inaccuracy continued a number of 
years. The indirect inequity manipulation showed only marginal significance. The 
inconsistent audit rate was highly significant, but in the opposite direction from that which 
was expected. If a taxpayer could not predict the likelihood o f being audited as a result 
o f inconsistent audit frequencies by the IRS, he was less likely to underreport business 
income. (Worsham, Jr. 1996).
While studies frequently focused on the attitudes and behavioral intentions of 
taxpayers and tax professionals, Roberts (1992) examined the factors used by IRS agents
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in their judgments in assessing penalties. The offending taxpayer's educational level, size 
of the audit adjustment, and the number o f years involved are all significant in the agents' 
decisions to assess penalties. Surprisingly, representation by a CPA (or lack thereof) was 
not significant. However, the interaction o f all the active variables including the 
representation by a CPA was considered significant in an agent’s decision to assess 
penalties.
Carnes and Englebrecht (1995) posited that taxpayers' attitudes regarding 
aggressive, risky tax positions were affected by two factors—the magnitude o f  potential 
IRS penalties and their personal perceptions o f the likelihood of detection. Indeed, 
empirical research supported hypotheses that compliance increased as the level o f 
sanctions increased and that tax compliance increased as taxpayers’ perceptions o f 
detection risk increased. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) also investigated the possible 
relationship between higher tax rates and higher frequencies o f noncompliance. They 
attempted to describe this theorized relationship by developing a mathematical model. 
Their ambiguous results testified to the difficulty in identifying any such relationship. On 
the other hand, another study found that if  a model incorporated penalties that were 
proportional to the amount o f tax evaded, tax cheating actually went down. The research 
concluded that as tax rates and penalties increased, expected evasion is decreased. 
Therefore, a risk averse taxpayer was less willing to cheat (Yitzliaki 1974).
Most research has focused on what is currently happening with regard to tax 
compliance. Roberts (1994) experimented with altering taxpayers’ attitudes through the 
use o f television public service announcements (PSA). He believed that if  taxpayers
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perceived the system as fair then compliance would go up. He also hypothesized that 
there were age and experience differences in people’s perceptions; therefore, alternate 
public service spots needed to be tailored toward each group. Roberts found a higher 
initial compliance attitude among older subjects before the experiment, but surprisingly 
the older group perceived the system as less fair. The results o f  his test o f the effect o f 
PSA’s on attitudes showed a greater effect on young taxpayers.
Moral Intensity
A moral issue is present whenever a person’s action, when freely performed, may 
harm or benefit others, (Velasquez and Rostankowski 1985). However, even an 
individual w'ith a well-developed sense o f moral reasoning may not have great resolve to 
act morally (Jones 1991). Fritzsche and Becker (1983) found that individuals act more 
ethically in dilemmas posing serious consequences than in less risky circumstances. Such 
evidence suggests that people react differently to moral issues in a manner that is related 
to characteristics of the issue itself, not just characteristics o f the decision maker himself. 
Recognizing moral issues has two elements. The decision maker must recognize that his 
actions affect others and some choice must be involved. A person who fails to recognize 
moral issues will fail to use moral decision-making schemata (Jones 1991).
Jones (1991, p. 372) introduces the moral intensity construct, that captures the 
“extent o f issue-related moral imperative in a situation”. Moral Intensity relates to 
characteristics o f  the moral issue as perceived by a decision maker and not to factors 
related to individual decision makers (Barnett, Brown, Bass, and Herbert 1999).
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Environmental factors and personal experiences affect perceptions of consequences. 
These perceptions lead to judgments that affect behavioral intentions. Intentions, along 
with issue-related constraints, affect behavior (Hunt and Vitell 1986). Characteristics of 
the moral issue itself, are important determinants o f decision making and behavior. 
“People become much more concerned about moral issues that affect those who are close 
to them rather than those with whom they have little or no contact”. “They also seem to 
react more strongly to injustices that have immediate effects as opposed to those that have 
effect in the distant future”. Moral intensity does not include traits o f moral decision 
makers (Jones 1991, p. 371).
Jones (1991) argues that six characteristics o f moral issues are related to moral 
decision making and behavior. These six characteristics are magnitude of consequences, 
social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration 
of effect. Measurements of moral intensity are possible only in broad terms (Jones 1991).
Taxpayer Testimony Before the Senate 
Finance Committee
Evidence suggests that politicians at all levels are responding to increased 
criticism o f the Internal Revenue Service and the complex Internal Revenue Code. 
During the 1996 presidential campaign, several o f the major candidates developed 
versions o f an income tax system featuring a flat tax rate. Each system required only a 
single page, postcard-sized return. Each suggested that no deductions would be allowed, 
but none explained how income would be defined. Also none accounted for the
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detrimental impact on individuals who had made long-term decisions based on deductions 
allowable under the current system.
Congress also responded to public outcry. In September 1997, the Senate Finance 
Committee held hearings regarding the operation o f the Internal Revenue Service. One 
group o f witnesses were taxpayers who believed they had been victims o f abusive 
treatment by the IRS; the other group were current or former IRS employees.
On September 25,1997, the Senate Finance Committee heard testimony from four 
individual taxpayers about abusive treatment each experienced from the Internal Revenue 
Service. Summaries o f  taxpayers’ testimonies along with the testimonies o f six current 
or former IRS employees are included in Appendix B. The following are partial 
descriptions of each taxpayer’s testimony.
Katherine Hicks (1997) detailed a nine year struggle with the IRS. The problem 
arose, in part, because the collection division had a separate computer system from the 
rest o f the IRS. The service assessed liens against her current husband's separate property 
in spite o f  its knowledge that her ex-husband had paid the entire liability. All liens were 
removed and her money refunded only after she contacted Senator Roth, chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee regarding testifying before the committee.
The service aggressively pursued collection of payroll taxes against Tom Savage's 
corporation by creating a fictitious entity and ascribing ownership to Mr. Savage. The 
IRS held a $150,000 check made out to Mr. Savage’s company under the authority o f a 
lien in another company’s name. A portion o f the money was returned to Mr. Savage only 
when he agreed to allow the IRS to keep approximately $50,000 in satisfaction o f a debt
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of the other firm. Mr. Savage (1997) testified that he agreed to the settlement because he 
needed the balance of the funds to pay his bills to keep his company in business.
A trust o f which Monsignor Ballweg was trustee was assessed a $17,000 liability 
because some supporting schedules were mis-referenced. His request for information 
about the return was denied because his application was signed merely with his name 
while the return had been signed by the same name along with a title o f trustee. After M. 
Ballweg contacted Senator Roth, the IRS not only provided the requested information; but 
assisted him in properly preparing the supporting schedules. No additional taxes were 
owed (Ballweg 1997).
Nancy Jacobs (1997) told of a seventeen year battle with the IRS resulting from 
the service's issuance of an employer identification number to her husband's business 
which in fact already was assigned to another person with a similar name. Within two 
hours o f her story being featured on a television show, the IRS contacted Mrs. Jacobs, 
informed her of the source o f the error and removed all liens. As o f the date o f her 
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Mrs. Jacobs had received no refund of 
the erroneously assessed taxes which she had paid.
IRS Employees’ Testimony Before the 
Senate Finance Committee
Immediately following the taxpayers' testimonies regarding abusive behavior o f 
the Internal Revenue Service, the Senate Finance Committee heard testimony from six 
current and former IRS employees. Employees' testimonies focused primarily on the 
inability o f  the IRS to police itself.
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Because the employees feared retaliation, witnesses provided credentials only to 
a single member of each o f the major political parties. To the committee they were 
identified only as witness no. 1 through witness no. 6 (Senate Finance Committee, 1997). 
They detailed a laundry list of abuses from blatant disregard for laws as well as a 
management more focused on meeting statistical goals than with appropriate 
administration o f the tax system. Much of the abuse came from the collection division 
or the internal inspection division rather than the mainstream IRS with which most 
taxpayers are familiar. Witnesses also talked o f hidden microphones both in employee 
lounges and in conference rooms used by taxpayers and their consultants. The witnesses 
also told o f browsing by IRS employees. Browsing is the practice o f looking at taxpayer 
records for reasons other than the administration of taxes. Employees may browse to find 
information about boyfriends/girlfriends or former spouses. Browsing may be motivated 
merely by curiosity about a famous person or even a neighbor. Sometimes it’s used to 
gather information about jurors on cases against the IRS. Many o f the witnesses believed 
collection procedures varied widely from taxpayer to taxpayer. This inconsistent 
treatment was aggravated by the lack o f any review procedure independent o f  the IRS.
While most o f the IRS employees chose to remain anonymous and testify from 
behind a screen, one, Jennifer Long (1997), not only identified herself, but testified in full 
view o f ail present. She testified to systematic targeting o f the poor in audits and 
fabrication o f data by the IRS. She also complained o f sexual and age discrimination by 
her bosses at the Houston office o f the agency. Mrs. Long was portrayed by the New 
York Times and by.Sam Donaldson on 20/20 as “a noble IRS agent who had received top
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
performance reviews until she blew the whistle” (Seligman 1999, p. 162). “In fact her 
work had been severely critiqued for several years before her testimony” (Seligman 1999, 
p. 162). Mrs. Long’s decision to testify openly was not her own. Her attorney advised that 
by identifying herself she would enjoy greater protection under federal “whistle-blower” 
laws. The gap between stated motivations and possible self-serving motives calls into 
question the image o f the IRS painted by the witnesses. Does the treatment by the IRS 
related in the testimony o f the four taxpayers represent the experiences of the majority o f 
taxpayers? To put the question in perspective, in 1991 alone over 114 million individual 
tax returns were filed (Rosacker and Davies 1997).
Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service 
Following congressional hearings including the Senate Finance Committee 
hearings in September, 1997, the “Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 
Act o f 1998” was enacted. Though the act provides for many changes in the income tax 
laws, portions focus on making the IRS more accountable and more helpful to the 
taxpaying public. Two groups of headings in the act specifically address the IRS’s 
relationship with taxpayers and the structure and accountability o f the Service. First, a 
group of provisions labeled “Taxpayer Bill o f Rights Provisions” spell out specific 
procedures for the IRS in dealing with taxpayers. Those provisions being examined in 
this study are itemized below. Second, provisions under the heading “Oversight and 
Restructuring o f IRS” set out the new oversight mechanism for the IRS along with 
restructuring mandates to more clearly define the mission o f the IRS and to improve the
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management o f its personnel. The restructuring changes included in this study are
discussed below.
Changes made by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998 that are examined in this study were the following:
1. The creation o f an oversight board to review the Service’s administration of 
Federal income tax compliance. The majority o f the board are not employees of 
the IRS, the Treasury Department, or any other government agency (IRC. Sec 
7802).
2. The creation o f a fund to provide grants to sponsor clinics for low income 
taxpayers (IRC. Sec 7526(a)).
3. Extension o f attorney-client privilege to non-attomey tax professionals such as 
accountants and enrolled agents (IRC. Sec. 7525).
4. The shifting of the burden of proof, in certain circumstances, in civil tax disputes 
from the taxpayer to the IRS (IRC. Sec. 7491).
5. The expansion of the circumstances under which taxpayers who successfully 
contest IRS positions may recover costs and fees (IRC. 7430).
6. Any manually prepared notice from the IRS must contain, in a prominent manner, 
the name, phone number, and unique identifying number o f the IRS employee that 
the recipient may contact regarding the notice (‘98 Act Sec. 3750(a)).
7. The IRS must set forth the criteria for selecting returns for audit. This information 
must be made available to the general public (‘98 Act Sec. 3503(a)).
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Introduction
The purpose of this research was to analyze factors that might affect individual 
taxpayers' perceptions o f noncompliant practices and behavioral intentions in filing 
federal income tax returns. Potential pertinent factors were identified through the 
researcher's personal work experience, discussions with tax professionals such as 
attorneys and accountants, and a review of the literature.
Taxpayers were divided into subgroups to examine whether demographic 
information including age, level o f household income, geographic location, education, and 
gender were factors that might affect perceptions and behavioral intentions. Analyses 
were also made to determine if ethical perceptions alone were enough to affect behavioral 
intentions or whether moral intensity was a necessary determinant o f such intentions.
Preliminary analysis identified three groups o f factors that might affect taxpayers' 
perceptions and intentions. These groups were the following:
1. Personal characteristics
2. Situational factors including reactions to steps taken by Congress to make the
Internal Revenue Service more efficient and responsive to taxpayers
3. Factors concerning awareness of consequences
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Based on this framework, a set o f relationships was hypothesized. A structural 
model presented in Figure 1 expresses these relationships graphically.
A search was conducted to select appropriate measurement instruments to 
accomplish the purpose o f the research. These instruments along with other questions 
were organized in a questionnaire (Appendix A). The survey questionnaire was mailed 
to a randomly selected list o f 3,109 individuals throughout the United States. The list was 
purchased from Direct Response Associates, a commercial company that brokers mailing 
lists for a variety o f purposes. The names were selected from a master list of 
approximately 228 million names updated periodically by The Polk & Co.
Hypotheses
Four groups o f hypotheses were developed to guide this research. The categories 
were (1) personal characteristics, (2) situational factors including reactions to Congress's 
steps to make the IRS more efficient and responsive, (3) consequential factors, and (4) 
ethical perceptions related to behavioral intent.
Personal Characteristics
Prior research has attempted to identify individual characteristics that affect 
taxpayers’ willingness to voluntarily comply. Much of this research has been limited by 
lack of demographic data related to filing income tax returns. Some studies attempted to 
draw conclusions by analyzing data from Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
(TCMP) audits (GAO 1990). Others have used demographic data readily available on tax 
returns such as age and marital status (Feinstein 1991). Dubin and Wilde (1988) used
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework
Behavioral Intentions
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TCMP data along with zip codes to identity groups of filers who were more likely or less 
likely than average to cheat on their tax returns. Research using only convenient data, 
such as age and marital status, to analyze personal characteristics that contribute to 
behavioral intentions with respect to paying taxes is limited to only a portion of many 
possible personal characteristics that may affect behavior. Age could be a surrogate for 
other characteristics such as idealism, relativism, religiosity, or conservatism. A 
necessary step in evaluating the effect o f personal characteristics on behavioral intentions 
is to determine the personal traits o f individual respondents. An idealist tends to judge 
situations using a rigid standard. On the other hand, a relativist tends to evaluate 
situations taking into account the surrounding circumstances.
Studies o f  the relationship between individual difference variables and ethical 
judgments and behavioral intentions found idealism and relativism had significant 
relationships with moral judgments (Bass, Burnett, and Brown 1999). The findings were 
consistent with results o f an earlier study by Davis, Johnson and Ohmer (1998) that 
examined three dimensions o f moral intensity described by Jones (1991). That study also 
found idealism and relativism varied reliably with moral judgments. Such studies have 
not focused on the impact o f these characteristics on income tax filing ethical dilemmas.
Religious beliefs have been found to have a discernible effect on people's attitudes 
and behavior (McDaniel and Burnett 1990). People who have a high level o f  intrinsic 
religiosity tend to be more moral (Wiebe and Fleck 1980). This morality may have an 
impact on behavioral intentions when filing income tax returns.
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Prior studies have identified a significant relationship between conservative 
ideology and conventional moral reasoning (Alker and Poppen 1973, and Candee 1976). 
The implication o f this relationship on ethical dilemmas in income tax filing 
circumstances has not been examined.
This research used a number o f previously validated scale to measure these 
personal characteristics. Specifically, scales were selected to estimate idealistic, 
relativistic, religious, and conservative characteristics o f survey subjects.
Hypotheses relating to personal characteristics that may affect ethical perceptions 
and behavioral intentions are the following:
HI Individuals who are highly idealistic are more likely to judge noncompliant tax
strategies as unethical.
H2 Individuals who are highly relativistic are more likely to judge noncompliant tax
strategies as ethical.
H3 Individuals who are highly conservative are more likely to judge noncompliant tax
strategies as unethical.
H4 Individuals who are highly religious are more likely to judge noncompliant tax
strategies as unethical.
Situations
Spicer and Becker (1980) found that perceptions of unfairness led to 
rationalizations o f noncompliance. In his research, Smith (1992) determined that 
taxpayers who believed that tax dollars were not well spent felt cheated and refused to pay 
their full liability. On the other hand, Aim, Jackson, and McKee (1992) found that those 
who believed they received benefits from public funds were more willing to comply.
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Partly in response to testimony from IRS agents and taxpayers before the Senate 
finance committee in September, 1997, Congress passed the Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act o f 1998. The expressed purpose of the act was to make the 
IRS more responsive and efficient (IRC Sec. 7802 1998). While the act made many 
changes to the tax laws, three sections dealt specifically with the operations of the Internal 
Revenue Service. Section 400 o f the act, entitled Taxpayer Bill of Rights, addressed the 
obligations o f the IRS in dealing with taxpayers. Sections 2000 and 2200 dealt with IRS 
oversight, restructuring, and administrative issues. Since taxpayers' responses to the 
efforts o f Congress to improve the IRS might affect individual attitudes about complying 
with tax laws, seven specific provisions o f the IRS restructuring act were examined in this 
research and are presented in Table 2.
Since studies have shown that perceptions o f fairness within the system and 
equitable use o f tax revenues affect compliance rates. Congress attempted to address 
these concerns with specific changes to the IRS included in the Internal Revenue 
Restructuring and Reform Act o f 1998. Accordingly, the following hypotheses were 
developed to test the impact, if any, of an overall attitude about paying federal income 
taxes and the perceived effectiveness o f the tax law changes.
H5 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward paying federal income taxes are
more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H6 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to the
creation o f an oversight board comprised of a majority of members who are not 
Treasury Department employees are more likely to judge noncompliant tax 
strategies as unethical.
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Table 2. Internal Revenue Service Reform and Restructuring Act o f 1998 Provisions
Included in Study
1. Creation o f an IRS oversight board comprised o f a majority o f members who 
are not Treasury Department employees.
2. Creation o f a fund to sponsor tax clinics for low income taxpayers.
3. Extension of attorney-client privilege to non-attomeys such as accountants and 
enrolled agents.
4. Shifting the burden of proof, in certain circumstances, to the IRS.
5. Expansion of circumstances under which taxpayers who successfully contest 
IRS positions may recover costs and fees.
6. A requirement that all non-computer generated correspondence from the IRS 
include the name, phone number, and unique identifying number, o f a specific 
IRS employee to contact.
7. A requirement that the IRS set forth criteria for audit selection and make this 
information available to the general public.
H7 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to the
creation of a fund to sponsor tax clinics for low-income taxpayers are more likely
to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H8 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to 
extension o f attomey-client privilege to non-attomeys such as accountants and 
enrolled agents are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H9 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to
shifting the burden of proof, in certain circumstances, to the IRS are more likely
to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H10 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to the 
expansion o f circumstances under which taxpayers who successfully contest IRS 
positions may recover costs and fees are more likely to judge noncompliant tax 
strategies as unethical.
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HI 1 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to a 
requirement for all non-computer generated IRS correspondence to include the 
name, phone number, and unique identification number o f a specific IRS 
employee to contact are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as 
unethical.
H12 Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to the IRS related to a 
requirement that the IRS set forth criteria for audit selection and make this 
information available to the general public are more likely to judge noncompliant 
tax strategies as unethical.
Consequences
Actions have consequences. Taxpayers who decide not to voluntarily comply with 
tax laws face real or perceived consequences. Researchers have looked at individuals' 
attitudes based on previous experience as well as expectations o f future contacts with the 
Internal Revenue Service. The results are somewhat mixed.
Prior audit experience was determined to have little effect on either compliance 
rates or amount o f tax dollars risked with noncompliance (Baldry 1987). Long and 
Schwartz (1987) found a similar result. Relationships were found, however, between 
compliance rates and magnitude of penalties and taxpayers’ perceptions o f the likelihood 
o f detection (Carnes and Englebrecht 1995). Yitzhaki (1974) found that compliance rates 
went up when penalties were proportionate to tax evaded.
Moral intensity is a measure o f moral imperativeness in a situation (Jones 1991). 
A number o f studies have analyzed the effects o f various dimensions o f moral intensity 
on ethical decision making. One study found that individuals were less concerned with 
immoral issues that resulted in harm in the future than ones that produced a more 
immediate harm (Dukerich, Waller, and Huber 1993). Others have found significant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
relationships between ethical judgment and severity ofharm or social consensus regarding 
harm done by an action (Singer 1996; and Singer and Singer 1997). Although 
noncompliance may be perceived as unethical, the belief that consequences are marginal 
or not immediate may lead taxpayers to “cheat” on their tax returns. To date, no research 
has focused on the concept o f moral intensity as it affects tax compliance decisions.
Hypotheses relating to awareness o f consequences factors that might affect ethical 
perceptions and behavioral intentions are the following:
H13 Individuals who perceive a high probability ofharm  from the action taken are
more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H14 Individuals who perceive that there are serious consequences from the action
taken are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H I5 Individuals who perceive that there is social consensus regarding the ethical
perception o f the action taken are more likely to judge noncompliant strategies as 
unethical.
H16 Individuals who perceive that any harm from the action taken will occur sooner
rather than later are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H 17 Individuals who perceive that any harm from the action taken affects those close
to themselves are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
H 18 Individuals who expect to be audited are more likely to judge noncompliant tax
strategies as unethical.
H19 Individuals who expect to be assessed additional taxes and penalties are more
likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Behavioral Intentions
Behavioral intent accounts for a large portion o f the variance in actual behavior. 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) found that intention is a precursor to behavior. In a later study
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) demonstrated that attitudes are sufficient to predict intentions. 
Attitudes toward a behavior, subjective norms, and perceived control correlate highly with 
behavior intentions (Ajzen 1991). This research evaluates the relationship between 
ethical perceptions and behavioral intentions.
Accordingly, the final hypothesis is as follows:
H20 Individuals who judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical are more likely to 
intend to comply with income tax laws.
Survey Instrument
For the mailout, a twelve-page questionnaire was developed. The document 
measured responses by survey subjects in order to test the various hypotheses. The 
complete survey instrument is presented in Appendix A. Each o f the nine sections o f the 
instrument is described in the paragraphs below.
Section 1
Section 1 contained three unique scenarios involving actions taken by federal 
income tax return filers. Each involved an individual either taking a deduction to which 
he was not entitled based on his facts and circumstances, or taking a deduction for which 
he did not have the required documentation. Following each scenario were various 
questions and validated scales to measure respondents’ ethical perceptions, moral 
intensity, and behavioral intentions with regard to the actions taken in the corresponding 
scenarios. The three scenarios are presented in Table 3. In Scenario A, a taxpayer took 
a deduction that was not justified based on his facts and circumstances. Scenario B
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Table 3. Ethical Dilemma Scenarios
Section 1 Scenario A:
John Harris operates his sole proprietorship out of his home. He completes many 
o f his activities there, but meets no clients. He uses space in his home alternately for 
personal and business use and would like to take a “home office” deduction- 
depreciation and an allocable portion o f utilities. He is aware that current tax law does 
not allow a home office deduction unless the business use is exclusive in the part o f the 
home claimed. He can legally take no deductions for a home office. Since he prepares 
his own tax return, John takes the deductions anyway.
Section 1 Scenario B:
Bob Dennis has made eight cash contributions to various charities this year. Each 
donation was between $300 and $500 and his only receipts are his canceled checks. 
Current Federal tax law states that no charitable deduction is allowed for any donation 
over $250 unless the taxpayer has a receipt from the charity which states the value of 
goods and services taxpayer received in consideration for the donation, if  any. 
Specifically, the law provides that the receipt must be in the possession o f the taxpayer 
before the deduction is taken on the return, not when notification o f a subsequent audit 
is received. Bob takes the deduction without the required receipts.
Section 1 Scenario C:
Jim Moore uses his car frequently in his business. However, he does not keep 
adequate records to support a business deduction on his personal tax return. He takes 
a significant deduction for business mileage on his return each year. He has no specific 
recollection o f the actual business use. Recently he received a notice that the IRS is 
going to audit last year’s return. In preparation for the audit Jim constructs a log o f his 
business and personal mileage for the year in question. The log is designed to agree 
with the deduction taken but is not based on actual knowledge of legitimate business 
use. He uses several different pens to complete the log so it will appear that it was kept 
jis^hejTfileag^was_actuall^inven^^^^^^^^^^n^ _ _ ^ ^ = _ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
presented a situation in which a taxpayer took a deduction to which he was clearly entitled 
but for the fact that he had not met a technical requirement for documentation mandated 
by the Internal Revenue Code. In Scenario C, a taxpayer manufactured documentation 
for an arbitrarily determined deduction only afier being notified of an IRS audit.
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Reidenbach and Robin (1988 and 1990) developed a multidimensional ethics scale 
using eight items evaluating three dimensions. They described these dimensions as moral 
equity, relativism, and contractualism. Florey, Phillips, Reidenbach, and Robin (1992) 
validated the scale in an accounting setting using dilemmas presented to management 
accountants. Their research indicated a high reliability factor resulting in coefficient 
alphas ranging from .75 to .94 for the three constructs over four scenarios. Cohen, Pant, 
and Sharp (1993) further validated the scale in an accounting setting by presenting three 
ethical dilemmas to 92 graduate and undergraduate accounting majors. They verified the 
original three dimensions identified by Reidenbach and Robin, but an additional 
utilitarian construct emerged as significant to accounting academics in ethical decision 
making.
This research used the summated results o f the Reidenbach and Robin scale as a 
measure o f ethical perception of the actions taken by tax filers in three scenarios. The 
Reidenbach and Robin Multidimensional Ethics Measure (Reidenbach and Robin 1990) 
was used to examine the ethical perceptions o f respondents to actions taken by each o f  the 
fictitious persons in the scenarios. The scale is presented in Figure 2.
Survey participants were asked to respond to eight items using a seven-point 
Likert scale with various bi-polar extremes such as fair/unfair or just/unjust. The scale 
was a modification of an earlier one developed by Reidenbach and Robin (1988) using 
thirty-three items. While the scale was developed in a marketing setting, it has been 
validated in several publications in accounting contexts (Florey et al. 1992 and Cohen et 
al. 1993).
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Scenario X: Ethical Dilemma is presented.
Please express your attitude toward the action taken by John on his return by placing 
a check ( / )  in a space between each o f the opposite adjectives that follow.
The eight-item, seven-point Multidimensional Ethics Scale
fair____:___ :___:___ :___:__ :___ unfair
just___ :___ :___:___ :___:__ :___ unjust
morally right___ :___:___ :___:___:___:___not morally right
acceptable to my family____:___:___ :___:___:___:___unacceptable to my family
culturally acceptable____:___:___ :___:___:___:___culturally unacceptable
traditionally acceptable____:___:___ :___:___:___:___traditionally unacceptable
violates an unwritten contract____:___:___ :___:___:___:___does not violate an unwritten
contract
violates an unspoken promise___ :___ :___:___ :___:__ :___ does not violate an unspoken
promise
Figure 2. Reidenbach and Robin (1990) Multidimensional Ethics Scale
Also in Section I was a moral intensity scale developed by Barnett et al. (1999). 
The scale was comprised of twenty-four items examining five dimensions o f moral 
intensity; probability ofharm , seriousness o f consequences, social consensus, temporal 
immediacy, and proximity. The instrument was based on work done by Jones (1991) that 
utilized six constructs to measure moral intensity. The scale was presented separately for 
each scenario. The complete scale is presented in Figure 3.
In addition to the scales discussed above, two questions were included with each 
scenario. One is a self-reported measure of respondents' probabilities o f  engaging in the
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P robability  o f  H arm
The likelihood that consequences to others will actually occur as a result o f  the 
action taken in scenario X is . . .
likely _____ ________________________________unlikely
improbable _____ ________________________________probable
impossible _____ ________________________________ possible
definitely would _____  ______________________ ______  definitely would not
S eriousness o f  C onsequences
Do you believe any harm resulting from the action taken in scenario X w ill be . . .
minor _____  ____ ____________ ______  _____  severe
serious _____  ____ _________________________  trivial
significant _____ ________________________________ insignificant
great _____ ________________________________ slight
small _____ _________________________ ______  large
Social C onsensus
Indicate the degree to which you feel society as a whole considers the action taken 
in scenario X.
evil _____ ____________ ______  _____  _____ good
ethical _____ ________________________________unethical
legal _____ _________________________ ______  illegal
wrong _____ ________________________________right
inappropriate _____ _________________________ ______  appropriate
T em poral Im m ediacy
Do you anticipate that nay consequences to others from the action taken in scenario  
X are likely to occur . . .
immediately _____ _________________________ ______  after a long time
never _____  ____  _____ _____ _____  _____ soon
quickly _____ ________________________________ slowly
belatedly _____ ________________________________ swiftly
gradually _____ ________________________________ rapidly
P roxim ity
Compared to yourself, do you believe those potentially affected by the action taken 
in scenario X are . . .
similar _____ ________________________________ dissimilar
not like _____ ________________________________ alike
compatible _____ ________________________________ incompatible
close _______  distant
different same
Figure 3. Barnett, Brown, Bass & Hebert (1999) Moral Intensity Scale
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same action as the taxpayer in the corresponding scenario. The other examined the 
possibility of a halo effect by asking responds to speculate on the likelihood that their 
neighbor would engage in the same action as the individual in the scenario.
Section 2
Section 2 contained eleven questions relating to the subjects’ impressions o f the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Federal income tax system. These questions were 
developed from discussions with practicing tax compliance professionals based on their 
experiences with taxpayers/clients. Responses were on a seven-point Likert scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Section 3
Remmers’ Attitude Toward Any Social Practice Scale (1960) was used in this 
research to measure the existing attitudes o f respondents regarding paying federal income 
taxes. The scale was validated by comparing results to known groups. Remmers reported 
internal reliability coefficients of .71 to .92. The scale may be modified to fit any social 
practice by substituting that activity in each of the prescribed statements about social 
practices. In this survey the social practice was paying federal income taxes. The 
Remmers scale is presented in Figure 4. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
statements with which they agreed. A predetermined weighting factor was assigned to 
each positive response. The higher the total score, the more positive the attitude about the 
social practice in question.
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V alue Statem ent
10.1 1. Should be practiced by all Americans.
9.7 2. Aids in bringing civilization to a h igher level.
9.2 3. Is endorsed by sensible people.
8.9 4. M any things about this practice are essential to normal living.
8.6 5. Keeps us from being “one-sided” .
8.1 6. As a rule is good.
7.7 7. Has m ore merit than demerit.
6.8 8. 1 would enjoy this practice if  it were changed somewhat.
6.0 9. I am not against this practice, but neither am 1 for it.
5.9 10. Isn 't absolutely bad but isn’t good either.
4.8 II . Is a little foolish. Isn 't absolutely bad but isn 't good either.
3.9 12. Has m ore disadvantages than advantages.
3.1 13. Is annoying.
2.6 14. We would be better o ff  without this practice.
2.2 15. Is not endorsed by sane people.
1.9 16. Serves no purpose.
1.0 17. 1 hate this practice worse than 1 hate anything else.
Figure 4. Remmers’ (1960) Attitude Toward Any Social Practice Scale
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Instructions: Below is a scries of statements designed to allow you to indicate the extent to which you agree 
with each statement. In answering, use the following response scale and write the number corresponding to 
your level of agreement with each statement in the space provided beside that statement.
Completely Moderately Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Moderately Completely
Disagree Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree. 
Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be.
The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to be gained.
One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and w elfare of another 
individual.
If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
Deciding whether or nut to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the act against the 
negative consequences of the act is immoral.
The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society .
It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action.
There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any code of ethics. 
What is ethical varies from one situation to another.
Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to "rightness".
Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic: what one person considers to be moral mas be 
judged to be immoral by another person.
Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to 
the individual.
Moral standards are simple personal rules which indicate how a person should behave and are not to be 
applied in makingjudgmcnts of others.
Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations arc so complex that individuals should be allowed to 
formulate their own individual codes.
Rigidly codifying an ethical option that prevents certain types of actions could stand in the way of belter 
human relations and adjustment.
No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissible totally 
depends upon the situation.
Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surrounding the action.
Figure 5. Forsyth's (1980) Idealism/Relativism Scale
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Section 4
Section 4 was Forsyth’s Idealism/Relativism Scale (Figure 5). The scale is a 
twenty-item, seven-point bi-polar Likert type scale (completely agree-completely 
disagree). The summated responses to the first ten items measured an individual’s 
idealism, the higher the score, the more idealistic. The summated responses to the second 
ten items measured an individual’s relativism; the higher the score, the more relativistic.
Section 5
Section 5 was comprised o f brief descriptions o f seven provisions o f the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act o f 1998 regarding operations o f the 
Internal Revenue Service. Congress intended these law changes to make the IRS more 
efficient and “user friendly”. The goal of this research was to measure individuals' 
expectations o f the effectiveness of the announced changes and to examine whether those 
expectations affected ethical perceptions. The questions were developed from 
conversations with tax professionals regarding the degree o f publicity each has received 
and the anticipated impact on individuals' contacts with the Internal Revenue Service.
Section 6
Section 6 was the Collins-Hayes Short Form Conservatism Scale (1993). The 
summated scale resulted in an overall conservatism measure based on five underlying 
constructs. The scale showed a coefficient alpha o f .82 and factor analysis confirmed the 
theorized constructs. Respondents rated their agreement or disagreement with each item 
on a seven-point Likert scale. The items were selected for their power to discriminate
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between known conservative and liberal groups. Five characteristics that made up the 
overall conservatism rating were: (1) militarism, (2) anti-hedonism, (3) anti-domination 
(intolerance o f discriminatory social conventions), (4) religious fundamentalism, and (5) 
anti-art (intolerance of alternative lifestyles). Table 4 presents the short-form scale used 
in this research.
Table 4. Collins-Hayes (1993) Short Form Conservatism Scale
Please indicate your level o f  agreement or 
num ber beside each item.
disagreem ent with the following statem ents by placing a
Completely Moderately 
Disagree Disagree
1 2
Slightly
Disagree
3
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
4
Slightly Moderately 
Agree Agree
5 6
Completely
Agree
7
Flag burning Heavy metal music
Chastity ROTC
Legalized abortion Strip shows
Premarital virginity Evolution theory
Casual sex Female clergy
Church authority Fundamental religion
Punk rockers Bible truth
Patriotism Divorce
Section 7
Section 7 was comprised of the McDaniel and Burnett Religiosity Scale (1990) 
(Figure 6). Along with the five responses measuring religiosity, respondents were asked 
to give a religious preference. Prior research has found that religious affiliation is 
significant in the development o f cognitive beliefs (McDaniel 1990). They also described
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religiosity as a sub-category o f human values. The most prevalent religious groups in the 
United States are Catholics, Protestants, and Jews (Gallop 1985). However, the religious 
affiliation question in the survey was open ended.
Please indicate your best response to the following statements by placing a check 
( / )  in a space between each of the opposite pairs below.
My religion is very important to me.
strongly disagree ___:___ :___:____ :__ :___ :___  strongly agree
I believe in God.
strongly disagree ___:___ :__ :_______ :_:___:___  strongly agree
How often do you attend church services/meetings?
Never Once a year Once a month Once a week More than once a week
What percentage of your after taxes income do you donate to your denomination or 
other ministries?
0% _____  1-3% _____  4-7%  ______  8-10%   >10%______
Figure 6. McDaniel and Burnett's (1990) Religiosity Scale
Section 8
Section 8 was the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Researchers have 
found that ethical measures suffer from bias introduced when respondents answer in a 
socially desirable manner (Ballard 1992). Respondents are motivated by respect for 
current social norms and practices, a need for approval, or a need for others to see them 
abide by societal rules (Randall & Fernandez 1991). Social desirability is often
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associated with impression management, self-deception, and self-justification, but may 
also appear as unique phenomena (Zerbe & Paulhus 1987). Presence o f socially desirable 
responses reduces the explanatory value o f self-reported scales. Accordingly, it is viewed 
as a contaminant in evaluating the responses (Ganster, Hennessey, & Luthans 1983).
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1960) was 
developed to estimate the social desirability bias. Later research questioned the 
usefulness o f the original Marlowe-Crowne scale as a result o f perceived biases in 
measuring responses from various groups such as male and female (Goldfried 1964). A 
number o f sub-scales were developed to mitigate these perceived weaknesses in the 
original scale (Ballard 1992). A subset o f the Marlowe-Crowne scale developed by 
Reynolds (1982) using principle components analysis was used in this research. The ten- 
item short form is presented in Figure 7.
Methods are available to minimize the impact o f social desirability bias on ethics 
research. These include assurance of anonymity and administering the questionnaire in 
a non-threatening environment (Randall & Fernandez 1991).
Section 9
Section 9 elicited demographic information regarding the respondents. This 
section also contained questions relating to prior experiences with the Internal Revenue 
Service as well as expectations o f future contact with the service. Information developed 
in this section was used along with the other variables tested to determine their impact, 
if any, in explaining variances in ethical perceptions.
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Listed below are a number o f statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. 
Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you 
personally.
1. I like to gossip at times.
2. There have been occasions when 1 took advantage of someone.
3. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
4. I always practice what I preach.
5. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
6. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
7. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
8. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
9. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my 
own.
10. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
Figure 7. Marlowe-Crowne Short Form Social Desirability Scale
(Reynolds 1982)
Methodology
Data were analyzed using hierarchical regression. Hierarchical regression tests 
independent variables in logical groupings called blocks. The significance o f explanatory 
value was determined for each variable individually and for the contribution o f the group 
as a whole. Demographic information comprised block one o f the independent variables 
in the regression equation. Age, household income, and education might explain a 
portion o f the variances in ethical perceptions. Personal characteristic variables idealism, 
relativism, religiosity, and conservatism comprised block two and tested hypotheses one
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through four. Scores o f  the various scales described previously were used as independent 
variables in the equation.
Situational variables comprised block three. The independent variables in this 
group were attitude about paying federal income taxes as measured by Remmers’ Attitude 
About Any Social Practice Scale and the individual responses regarding perceptions of 
changes in the tax laws that were intended to correct some o f  the perceived abuses by the 
Internal Revenue Service. Block three tested hypotheses five through twelve.
Block four in the equation tested the effect, if any, o f  awareness o f consequences 
on ethical perceptions. Moral intensity was evaluated using the summated responses to 
the five underlying dimensions. Self-reported expectations o f an IRS audit and 
expectations o f additional assessments were included in this block. Responses were on 
a seven-point highly-likely to highly-unlikely scale. Block four tested hypotheses thirteen 
through nineteen.
A separate regression was run to test the significance o f ethical perceptions in 
explaining variances in expected behaviors. Self-reported expectations that respondents 
were likely or not likely to engage in the same action as the subject in each scenario were 
used as the dependent variable. The summated responses o f the Reidenbach and Robin 
Multidimensional Ethical Scale were used as the independent variable. This regression 
tested hypothesis twenty.
Information gathered using the described questionnaire was utilized in testing the 
various hypotheses. The specific scales used and corresponding hypotheses tested are 
summarized in Figure 8.
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Section_____________________ Scale__________________Hypotheses Tested
1 Reidenbach and Robin 1 -20
Multidimensional Ethics Scale (1990)
1 Barnett, Brown, Bass and Hebert Moral 13-17
Intensity Scale (1999)
3 Remmers’ Attitude Toward Any Social 5
Practice Scale (1960)
4 Forsyth’s Idealism/ Relativism Scale 1-2
(1980)
6 Collins-Hayes Short Form 4
Conservatism Scale (1993)
7 McDaniel-Bumett Religiosity Scale 3
(1990)
Figure 8. Measurement Scales Used in Regression and Corresponding
Hypotheses Tested
The next chapter describes the data collection process and the analysis o f that data. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results o f hypotheses testing and the conclusions o f the research.
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RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of this research. This chapter 
is presented in several sections. The first section describes the data collection. 
Characteristics o f sample respondents comprise section two. The third section presents 
descriptive statistics of the pertinent study variables. The next section includes factor 
analyses for the ethical perception and moral intensity scales along with reliability 
coefficients and discussion o f correlation matrices for the sets o f variables analyzed for 
each scenario. The last section presents the results o f the hierarchical regressions that 
were conducted to test hypotheses.
Data Collection
The sample frame for this research was a randomly selected list o f 3,109 names 
and addresses comprised of individuals throughout the United States. The sample was 
selected proportionately from the fifty states based on populations. Only those individuals 
with household incomes greater than $15.000 were included. The threshold income was 
intended to increase the probability that respondents were tax return filers who would be 
more aware o f ethical issues involved in federal income tax return filings. The odd
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number o f names was based on the pricing policy o f the list broker. Direct Response 
Marketing. The Polk & Co. maintains a list o f approximately 228 million names for 
various solicitation purposes. Direct Response Marketing contracts with The Polk & Co. 
to extract mailing lists based on a large number o f selection filters such as geographic 
location, age. gender, and income.
Surveys were mailed in two waves four weeks apart. The first mailing included 
the questionnaire, a postage-paid business reply envelope, and a transmittal letter 
explaining the nature and significance o f the research. A subsequent mailing included the 
same questionnaire and return envelope, but a modified letter strengthening the appeal to 
those who had not responded to the first mailing. Those who had responded to the first 
solicitation were asked not to respond a second time.
The first wave resulted in 207 responses from which 175 usable surveys were 
obtained. The second wave brought in an additional 127 questionnaires o f which 118 
were usable. Unusable response resulted from surveys returned blank (29) or with too 
little information provided (12) to be useful. There were 293 useable surveys out o f 3,109 
mailed, resulting in an overall response rate o f 9.7%.
Wave one mean responses for all variables in the study were compared to wave 
two mean responses to examine potential non-response bias. Results o f this comparison 
are presented in Table 5. Most o f the comparisons yielded insignificant differences. 
However, wave two respondents perceived a higher probability ofharm  from taxpayers' 
actions in all three scenarios. Wave two responders were, by inference, non-responders 
to wave one. Apparently, non-responders expected a higher probability o f harmful
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Table 5. Evaluation of Differences Among Early Respondents and Late Respondents
Variable
Separate V ariance Estimates 
C roup Number M ean Value t value 2-tail probability
Scenario A
Ethical Perception
Expectation o f  Behavior 
Probability o f  Harm 
Seriousness o f  Consequences 
Social Consensus 
Tem poral Immediacy 
Proximity
Scenario B
Ethical Perception
Expectation o f  Behavior 
Probability o f  Harm 
Seriousness o f  Consequences
Social Consensus
Tem poral Immediacy 
Proximity
4.71
4.40
5.45
5.17
3.66
4.10
2.98
2.88
4.16
4.19
2.63
2.69
4.24
4.21
3.44
3.74
3.79
4.29
3.10
3.52 
2.39 
2.68 
3.38 
3.62 
2.36 
2.60 
4.82
4.53
1.13
1.12
- 2.10
.51
-.21
-.43
.13
-1.41
-1.64
-2.07
-1.44
- 1 . 2 1
-1.46
1.26
.258
.265
.036
.608
.832
.665
.893
.161
.161
.040
.149
.229
.144
.210
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Table 5 -  Continued
V aria b le G ro u p  N u m b er
S ena ra te  V ariance  E stim ates 
M ean V alue t  value 2 -ta il P ro b ab ility
S cen a rio  C
Ethical Perception 1 4.75 -.60 .549
2 4.86
Expectation o f  Behavior 1 5.37 -.33 .549
2 5.45
Probability o f  Harm 1 3.49 -2.13 .034
2 3.94
Seriousness o f  Consequences 1 3.10 -.51 .609
2 3.21
Social Consensus 1 4.37 -.32 .750
2 4.42
Tem poral Immediacy 1 2.78 -.28 .778
2 2.83
Proximity I 4.19 -.13 .899
2 4.22
P ercen tio n  o f Law  C h an g e
V ariab les
O versight Board 1 5.35 .99 .323
2 5.19
Fund for sem inars for Low 1 4.51 -1.06 .289
Incom e Earners 2 4.73
A ttorney/Client Privilege for 1 4.70 1.04 .297
A ccountants 2 4.49
Shift in Burden o f  Proof
1 5.74 2.37 .018
2 5.34
Recovery o f  Costs/Fees
1 5.85 2.26 .025
2 5.51
IRS Employee to Contact 1 5.94 1.45 .148
Regarding Correspondence 2 5.72
Disclose Audit Selection 1 5.49 .88 .381
Process 2 5.31
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Table 5 -  Continued
Separate Variance Estim ates
Variable_____________________ G roup Num ber Mean Value t value 2-tail Probability
O ther Study Variables
Age 1 50.56 -.63 .532
2 51.68
Income (in Thousands) 1 67.89 1.27 .205
2 60.34
Education 1 4.15 2.92 .004
2 3.65
Attitude Towards a Social 1 4.51 .66 .510
Practice 2 4.36
Idealism 1 5.27 -1.31 .190
2 5.46
Relativism 1 3.41 -2.06 .040
2 3.73
Conservatism 1 4.69 -.64 .526
2 4.77
Religiosity 1 4.97 -.16 .873
2 4.99
Expectation o f  Audit 1 3.09 .85 .398
2 2.92
Expectation o f  Additional 1 2.47 .47 .638
Assessments 2 2.36
G roup I = Respondents to first wave
G roup 2 = Respondents to second wave
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consequences resulting from noncompliance strategies regardless of the circumstances o f 
the tax return filers.
Impressions o f taxpayers regarding changes to the operations o f the Internal 
Revenue Service were significantly different between the first mailing and the second 
with respect to two of the seven law changes included in the survey. Specifically, second 
wave respondents looked less favorably than wave one respondents upon changes in the 
tax laws related to the shift, in certain circumstances, of burden of proof to the IRS and 
expansion o f circumstances under which taxpayers may recover costs and fees when 
successfully defending a position against the IRS. Therefore, non-respondents might 
expect a less beneficial effect from these two law changes than early respondents.
Second wave respondents were significantly less educated than first wave 
respondents. It is probable that better educated individuals are more likely to complete 
a questionnaire as long and as complex as the one included in the survey. An alternate 
explanation might be that less educated people in the sample feared the information 
gathered would end up in the hands of the IRS and be traceable to individual respondents. 
Second wave respondents were more relativistic than wave one respondents. Non­
response bias might affect some results.
Demographic Characteristics o f  Respondents
Demographic information about the sample respondents is presented in this 
section and are summarized in Table 6. The mean age o f respondents was 51.01 years 
with a standard deviation o f 14.84 years and a median o f 50 years. Household income
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Table 6. Selected Demographic Characteristics o f Respondents
Variable Mean Std Dev M edian
Age 51.01 14.84 50
Household Income 
(Thousands)
64.93 47.60 50
V ariable C ategory F requency V alid P erce n tag e
G ender Male 201 68.8
Female 91 31.2
Race African/American 10 3.4
Asian /Am erican 7 2.4
Hispanic 6 2.0
White 260 88.7
Other 10 3.4
M arital Status Married 191 66.8
Never M arried 31 10.8
Divorced 39 13.6
Widowed 25 8.7
Previously Audited Yes 75 25.6
No 218 74.4
Claim  Dependents Yes 109 37.2
No 184 62.8
Em ploym ent Professional/
Technical
160 55.7
Clerical and sales 24 8.4
Service 19 6.6
Agricultural/Fishery 5 1.8
Processing 1 .3
Machine trades 5 1.8
Structural W ork 4 1.4
Miscellaneous 9 3.1
Not Working 60 20.9
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Table 6 -  Continued
Variable_____________________Category__________________ Frequency_______Valid Percentage
Education 1-11 years 7 2.4
High school diplom a 45 15.4
Some college 71 24.2
College degree 73 24.9
Some postgraduate/ 26 8.9
professional training
Graduate Degree 71 24.2
Return Preparer Self prepared 108 36.9
Friend/family 23 7.8
Paid preparer 156 53.2
None required 6 2.0
G eographic Region Northeast 46 15.7
Southeast 81 27.6
Great Lakes 77 26.3
Midwest 12 4.1
Southwest 39 13.3
Pacific Border 38 13.0
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averaged $64,930 per year with a standard deviation o f $47,600 and a median o f  $50,000. 
Average household income for the United States in 1996, the latest available data, was 
about $35,000. (Statistical Abstract o f the United States 1998, Table No. 741). Incomes 
of individual respondents ranged from zero to $400,000.
Respondents were predominately male, sixty-eight percent, compared to thirty-two 
percent females. Ninety percent were white. Married individuals (66.8%) who claimed 
no dependents (62.8%) also dominated the sample. Of the 293 respondents, 75 had 
previously been audited by the Internal Revenue Service. Since fewer than one percent 
o f tax filers are audited each year, such a response seems disproportionately high. 
Educated, higher earning citizens were not only more likely to be audited but also would 
be more likely to reply to such a complex questionnaire.
Approximately 56% of respondents were professional/technical employees. 
Approximately 58% had a college degree or some type o f post-graduate education. The 
rate nationally was approximately 24% in 1996 (Statistical Abstract o f the United States 
1998, Table No. 260). Over half (53.2%), paid someone to prepare their tax returns, 
while almost 37% prepared their own returns. The others either were not required to file 
or had someone, such as a friend or relative, prepare their returns at no cost.
Responses were received from throughout the United States. Southeastern states 
accounted for the greatest number o f responses, 81 (27.6%). The Great Lakes area 
accounted for the next greatest number with 77 (26.3%). The Great Plains states with 
smaller population bases provided the least responses with 12 (4.1%).
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Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for variables o f interest in this dissertation. 
All study variables except age, education, and household income were measured using a 
seven-point Likert scale or a semantic differential scale. Scores for individual ethical 
perceptions o f the actions taken by taxpayers in the three scenarios ranged from ! 
(completely ethical) to 7 (completely unethical). Overall ethical perception scores were 
derived from means o f the responses to the eight items in the Reidenbach and Robin 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale. Means for Scenario A through C were 4.62, 3.56, 4.79, 
respectively. Survey subjects viewed all the actions as somewhat unethical with Scenario 
B, the charitable donation scenario, being less unethical than the other two.
Moral intensity was measured using the five underlying constructs o f the Barnett, 
et al. (1999) scale. Means were computed by summing each dimension’s responses and 
dividing by the number o f items in the scale. Overall, respondents believed that the 
actions represented in the scenarios did not have serious consequences nor did they expect 
consequences to occur soon. Respondents' perceptions o f social consensus regarding the 
action taken in scenario B, charitable donation, were less morally intense than the actions 
taken in the other scenarios.
Impressions of the effectiveness o f changes in the tax laws intended to make the 
Internal Revenue Service more efficient and responsive indicate that survey participants 
generally considered the changes more beneficial than not. Changes related to creation 
o f a fund to provide tax clinics for low-income taxpayers and extension of attorney/client 
privilege to non-attorneys were considered less effective than the other five provisions.
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics o f Study Variables
V ariab le M ean M edian M ode | S td  Dev Skew ness K u rto sis
S cen ario  A
Ethical Perception 4.62 4.69 7 1.63 -.40 -.59
Expectation o f  Behavior 5.34 6.50 7 2.14 -.95 -.64
Probability o f  Harm 3.84 3.75 4 1.73 .35 -.79
Seriousness o f  Consequences 2.94 2.60 1 1.68 .67 -.30
Social Consensus 4.17 4.00 4 1.43 -.08 -.10
Tem poral Immediacy 2.65 2.60 1 1.27 .73 .80
Proximity 4.23 4.00 4 1.84 . ~n -.79
S cen ario  B
Ethical Perception 3.56 3.50 1 1.84 .27 -1.04
Expectation o f  B ehavior 3.99 4.00 7 2.54 .06 -1.74
Probability o f  Harm 3.27 3.00 1 1.71 .61 -.40
Seriousness o f  Consequences 2.51 2.00 1 1.66 1.08 -.41
Social Consensus 3.48 3.60 I 1.69 .22 -.76
Tem poral Immediacy 2.46 2.20 1 1.39 .92 .83
Proximity 4.70 4.80 4 1.89 -,52 -.65
S cen ario  C
Ethical Perception 4.79 5.00 7 1.56 -.57 -.29
Expectation o f  Behavior 5.40 7.00 7 2.09 -1.01 -.43
Probability o f  Harm 3.67 3.75 4 1.79 .33 -.77
Seriousness o f  C onsequences 3.15 3.00 1 1.78 .50 -.65
Social Consensus 4.39 4.40 4 1.53 -.28 -.33
Tem poral Immediacy 2.80 2.80 1 1.47 .74 .36
Proxim ity 4.20 4.00 4 1.95 -.27 -.96
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Table 7 -  Continued
Variable Mean Median Mode 1 Std Dev Skewness K urtosis
Perception o f  Law Change 
Variables
O versight Board 5.28 5.00 6 1.36 -.76 .84
Fund for Seminars for Low 
Income Earners
4.60 5.00 4 1.69 -.44 -.39
A ttorney/Client Privilege for 
Accountants 4.62
4.00 4 1.67 -.34 -.42
Shift in Burden o f  Proof 5.58 6.00 7 1.43 -1.05 .86
Recovery o f  Costs/Fees 5.71 6.00 6 1.28 -1.06 1.14
IRS Em ployee to Contact 
Regarding Correspondence
5.85 6.00 7 1.28 -.94 .27
Disclose Audit Selection 5.42 6.00 7 1.64 -.92 .26
O ther Study Variables
Age 51.01 50.00 50 14.84 .10 -.65
H ousehold Income 
(in Thousands)
64.93 50.00 50 47.60 2.32 10.15
Education 3.95 4.00 4 1.46 .07 -1.10
A ttitude Toward Paying Income 
Taxes
4.45 4.60 5.68 1.91 -.15 -.45
Idealism 5.35 5.50 5.50 1.16 -1.05 1.17
Relativism 3.54 3.60 3.20 1.31 -.06 -.76
Conservatism 4.72 4.69 5.00 .93 -.04 -.53
Religiosity 4.98 5.04 6.44 1.28 -.56 -.15
Expectation o f  Audit 3.02 3.00 4 1.67 .40 -.61
Expectation o f  Additional 
Assessm ents
2.42 2.00 1 1.79 1.17 .31
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Note, however, the mean household income o f respondents was approximately $65,000. 
Possibly this group was not sympathetic to the circumstances o f low-income tax return 
filers.
Responses indicate that most participants believed that an IRS audit was unlikely 
and that if audited additional assessments were even less likely. The additional 
assessment responses, however, were more broadly distributed and somewhat skewed 
toward the more likely range.
Household income deviated most from a normal distribution pattern based on its 
skewness and kurtosis measures. Average household income was $64,930, however, 
distributions were significantly skewed toward upper income ranges and distributions 
were over a wider range than would normally be expected. Both F and t are robust as to 
the assumption of normalcy. Therefore, the F-statistic will reasonably follow the F- 
distribution and probabilities from the t-tables are reasonably applicable in calculating the 
t-statistic (Box and Tiao 1973). Accordingly, deviations of study variables from normalcy 
were not considered to be a significant problem in this research.
Measurement o f  Constructs
Factor Analysis
The measurement properties o f the Reidenbach and Robin Multidimensional 
Ethics Scale have been tested in accounting studies as well as studies in other fields 
(Reidenbach and Robin 1988 and 1990; Florey etal. 1992). The scale, however, has not 
previously been used in a study about income tax filing. Factor analysis was performed
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to examine the factor makeup with respect to the theorized structure. Maximum 
likelihood factor analysis was employed using a varimax rotation. Results o f factor 
analysis for all three scenarios are presented in Table 8.
Solutions resulted in three factors that were consistent with theory. These factors 
were previously described as moral equity, relativism, and contractualism (Reidenbach 
and Robin 1990). Moral equity explained the greatest proportion o f the variance in 
ethical perceptions, contractualism next greatest, and relativism the least in all scenarios.
Moral intensity scales developed by Barnett et al. (1999) have not been widely 
used. Accordingly, factor analysis was performed to compare the factor structure o f the 
items to theorized structures. Results are presented in Table 9. The analysis resulted in 
live factors as hypothesized. Explanatory values o f the five dimensions were relatively 
consistent across the three scenarios. In Scenarios A and C, seriousness o f consequences 
was most significant in explaining variance followed by proximity. Proximity replaced 
seriousness of consequences as the most significant in Scenario B, charitable donations. 
In all other respects the factors had consistent relevance in explaining the variances in 
moral intensity responses for the three scenarios.
Reliability
Coefficient alpha assesses the internal consistency o f measurement scales. 
Coefficient alphas are presented in Table 10. Scores above .70 are deemed to be an 
indication of adequate internal consistency (Nunnally 1978). Internal consistency is 
significant in assessing associations o f variables since absence o f reliability would lower
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Table 8. Ethical Perception Factor Analysis
C onstruct Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Scenario A
M oral Equitv
Fair 0.900 0.199 0.232
Just 0.925 0.176 0.241
M oral 0.680 0.318 0.242
Family acceptable 0.670 0.313 0.334
Relativism
Culturally acceptable 0.232 0.001 0.868
Traditionally acceptable 0.300 0.123 0.795
Contractualism
Violate written contract 0.231 0.904 0.001
Violate spoken contract 0.274 0.896 0.120
E igenvalue 4.708 1.346 0.957
Percent variance explained 58.853 16.830 11.959
Percent o f  total variance explained 87.642
Construct Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Scenario B
M oral Eauitv
Fair 0.903 0.224 0.296
Just 0.905 0.231 0.305
Moral 0.761 0.305 0.319
Family acceptable 0.740 0.264 0.439
Relativism
Culturally acceptable 0.364 0.195 0.835
Traditionally acceptable 0.364 0.183 0.858
Contractualism
Violate written contract 0.252 0.927 0.160
Violate spoken contract 0.257 0.916 0.196
E igenvalue 5.509 1.185 0.758
Percent variance explained 68.864 14.814 9.470
Percent o f  total variance explained 93.148
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Table 8 -  Continued
Construct Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3
Scenario C
M oral Eauitv
Fair 0.923 0.212 0.266
Just 0.904 0.233 0.268
Moral 0.756 0.279 0.271
Family acceptable 0.729 0.254 0.396
Relativism
Culturally acceptable 0.281 0.176 0.918
Traditionally acceptable 0.348 0.163 0.657
Contractualism
Violate written contract 0.260 0.902 0.161
Violate spoken contract 0.250 0.912 0.184
Eigenvalue 5.149 1.171 0.873
Percent variance explained 64.367 14.642 10.917
Percent o f  total variance explained 89.926
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Table 9. Moral Intensity Factor Analysis
Construct Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
S cen a rio  A
Seriousness o f  Conseauences
Minor 0.892 -0.081 0.115 0.060 0.063
Trivial 0.885 -0.082 0.155 0.034 0.117
Insignificant 0.840 -0.021 0.170 0.073 0.134
Slight 0.927 -0.045 0.133 0.024 0.069
Small 0.892 -0.053 0.155 0.107 0.091
Proxim ity
Dissimilar -0.016 0.922 -0.004 -0.050 0.025
Not like -0.039 0.917 -0.020 -0.051 -0.023
Incom patible -0.067 0.890 0.035 -0.085 -0.078
Distant -0.084 0.875 -0.029 -0.126 0.020
Different 0.081 0.909 0.015 -0.077 -0.100
Tem ooral Immediacy
Longtime 0.038 0.030 0.803 -0.061 0.121
Never 0.242 -0.001 0.608 0.021 0.228
Slowly 0.159 -0.067 0.885 -0.085 0.091
Belated 0.198 0.019 0.889 -0.037 0.111
Gradual 0.101 -0.015 0.770 -0.093 0.029
Social Consensus
Good 0.078 -0.143 -0.082 0.727 0.087
Ethical 0.083 -0.062 -0.006 0.747 0.110
Legal 0.031 -0.067 -0.075 0.685 -0.020
Right 0.017 -0.035 -0.024 0.904 0.103
A ppropriate 0.041 -0.039 -0.050 0.907 0.084
Probability o f  Harm
Likely 0.149 -0.023 0.116 0.085 0.899
Probably 0.089 0.026 0.104 0.048 0.850
Possibly 0.042 -0.070 0.063 0.131 0.601
Definite 0.117 -0.049 0.194 0.048 0.734
Eigenvalue 6.042 4.647 3.416 2.716 2.071
Percent Variance Explained 
Percent o f  Total Variance Explained
25.173 19.361 14.232 11.318 8.628
78.713
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Table 9 -  Continued
Construct Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
S cen a rio  B
Proxim itv
Dissimilar 0.958 -0.110 -0.054 -0.141 -0.032
N ot like 0.965 -0.109 -0.050 -0.147 -0.032
Incompatible 0.909 -0.161 0.054 -0.137 -0.038
Distant 0.902 -0.099 -0.110 -0.158 0.023
Different 0.840 -0.137 -0.054 -0.198 -0.034
Seriousness o f  Conseauences
M inor -0.164 0.828 0.207 0.124 0.209
Trivial -0.118 0.898 0.162 0.173 0.180
Insignificant -0.143 0.861 0.221 0.197 0.210
Slight -0.146 0.877 0.213 0.171 0.157
Small -0.146 0.858 0.243 0.182 0.156
Tem ooral Immediacv
Longtim e - 0.001 0.165 0.822 0.030 0.188
N ever - 0.001 0.302 0.685 0.154 0.263
Slowly - 0.001 0.212 0.890 0.014 0.114
Belated - 0.001 0.172 0.933 0.036 0.150
Gradual -0.102 0.125 0.867 0.018 0.097
Social Consensus
G ood -0.181 0.199 0.082 0.800 0.139
Ethical -0.164 0.159 0.039 0.794 0.202
Legal -0.179 0.108 0.032 0.766 0.142
Right -0.150 0.160 0.052 0.910 0.146
Appropriate -0.119 0.122 0.017 0.882 0.188
Probability o f  Harm
Likely -0.028 0.185 0.212 0.153 0.853
Probably -0.046 0.193 0.180 0.195 0.865
Possibly -0.017 0.190 0.107 0.221 0.630
Definite -0.015 0.163 0.210 0.192 0.727
Eigenvalue 9.430 4.099 3.096 2.137 1.649
Percent Variance Explained 
Percent o f  Total Variance Explained
39.291 17.080 12.898 8.903 6.871
85.043
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Table 9 -  Continued
Construct Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Scenario C
Proxim ity
Dissimilar 0.958 -0.117 -0.028 -0.181 0.071
Not like 0.967 -0.114 -0.016 -0.116 -0.012
Incompatible 0.947 -0.126 -0.014 -0.123 -0.028
Distant 0.930 -0.135 -0.114 - 0.101 0.012
DifTerent 0.929 - 0.111 -0.011 -0.071 -0.096
Seriousness o f  C onseauences
Minor -0.161 0.886 0.235 0.112 0.148
Trivial -0.141 0.873 0.217 0.128 0.179
Insignificant -0.128 0.820 0.204 0.109 0.218
Slight -0.131 0.938 0.204 0.107 0.137
Small -0.133 0.914 0.224 0.102 0.161
Tem ooral Immediacy
Longtime 0.007 0.192 0.836 0.068 0.201
Never -0.019 0.237 0.754 0.103 0.282
Slowly 0.038 0.168 0.929 0.014 0.118
Belated 0.032 0.205 0.853 0.032 0.135
Gradual 0.008 0.178 0.847 0.039 0.049
Social Consensus
Good -0.090 0.113 0.012 0.841 0.143
Ethical •0.081 0.092 0.035 0.843 0.148
Legal -0.094 0.038 0.055 0.775 0.147
Right -0.104 0.115 0.056 0.905 0.132
Appropriate -0.099 0.120 0.078 0.896 0.146
Probability o f  Harm
Likely -0.078 0.199 0.229 0.196 0.854
Probably 0.025 0.191 0.206 0.136 0.915
Possibly -0.014 0.147 0.113 0.169 0.696
Definite -0.057 0.165 0.151 0.225 0.757
Eigenvalue 8.522 4.768 3.505 2.154 1.852
Percent Variance Explained 
Percent o f  Total V ariance Explained
35.509 19.867 14.603 8.975 7.718
86.672
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
Table 10. Scale Reliability
Construct Coefficient A lpha
Ethical Perceptions
Scenario A .90
Scenario B .93
Scenario C .92
Probability o f  Harm
Scenario A .87
Scenario B .90
Scenario C .93
Seriousness o f  Consequences
Scenario A .96
Scenario B .97
Scenario C .98
Social Consensus
Scenario A .90
Scenario B .94
Scenario C .94
Tem poral Im m ediacy
Scenario A .96
Scenario B .94
Scenario C .94
Proximity
Scenario A .90
Scenario B .97
Scenario C .98
Idealism .85
Relativism .82
Conservatism  .80
Religiosity .8 1
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correlations (Schmitt & Klimoski 1991). Reliability is a necessary component o f a valid 
scale (Churchill 1991).
Correlations Among Study Variables
Correlations among the various study variables were computed and are presented 
in Appendix C. Correlations significant at the .05 level or better are discussed in the 
following paragraphs.
Scenario A
Ethical perceptions that the action taken in Scenario A are unethical were 
positively and significantly correlated with expected behavior, and the moral intensity 
dimensions probability o f harm, seriousness o f consequences, and social consensus. 
Ethical perceptions were negatively correlated with proximity. Perceptions that the action 
taken was unethical were also negatively associated with relativism and positively 
associated with conservatism and religiosity. Ethical perceptions were also correlated 
with an overall positive attitude about paying federal income taxes. O f the variables 
representing attitudes about the effectiveness o f tax law changes, only extension o f 
attorney/client privilege was significantly correlated with ethical perceptions and that 
relationship was negative.
Expected behavior correlated with all the same variables as ethical perceptions 
except the associations with probability o f harm and overall attitudes about paying federal 
income taxes were not significant. In addition to relationships identified with ethical 
perceptions, expected behavior was positively and significantly correlated with education.
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Many o f the moral intensity constructs were positively correlated with each other 
as expected. In addition, probability o f harm was positively associated with age. 
Temporal immediacy was correlated with a number o f the attitudes about the 
effectiveness o f law changes intended to make the IRS more responsive to taxpayers. 
Surprisingly, those respondents who perceived a more immediate harm viewed taking an 
erroneous deduction for home-'office use as less unethical than those who believed any 
such harm was not immediate.
Scenario B
Most of the relationships identified in Scenario A were also present among the 
variables in Scenario B. Temporal immediacy was significantly correlated with ethical 
perceptions in B. but not A. The significance of an overall favorable attitude toward 
paying taxes identified in Scenario A was not present in Scenario B. However, in 
Scenario B, perceptions that the action taken was unethical were significantly and 
negatively associated with education and household income. These relationships were not 
present in Scenario A.
Correlations o f expected behaviors with other study variables followed much the 
same pattern as in Scenario A. The relationships with two of the moral intensity 
constructs, probability o f harm and temporal immediacy, were positive and significant in 
Scenario B although they are not significant in Scenario A. No significant relationship 
existed between expected behavior and education as was the case in Scenario A. 
However, a negative correlation with household income was identified.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
Moral intensity variables correlated with other study variables in the second 
vignette in much the same manner as in the first. However, the associations between 
temporal immediacy and several of the attitudes about the effectiveness o f changes to the 
IRS in Scenario A were not present in Scenario B.
Scenario C
Correlation patterns were very much the same among variables in Scenario C 
compared to variables in Scenario B. Noticeably different were significant, positive 
relationships in C between ethical perceptions and two o f the law change variables, the 
fund for clinics for low-income taxpayers and disclosure o f the IRS audit selection 
criteria. Those who believed those two law changes were effective in improving the IRS 
were more likely to perceive constructing bogus documentation as unethical. Both ethical 
perceptions and expected behaviors were significantly and positively correlated with 
conservatism in Scenario C, but the relationship was not significant in Scenario B.
Hierarchical Regression Results
Hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression. Control variables were 
entered first in the regression. The control variables were age, education, and household 
income. Personal characteristic variables idealism, relativism, religiosity, and 
conservatism were entered as block two. The situational variables comprised block three. 
Finally, the group o f variables made up of moral intensity constructs along with 
expectations o f IRS audits and expectations o f additional assessments were entered.
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Significance o f each equation was evaluated using F statistic. The significance of the F 
statistic, or p-value, for each variable is presented in Table 11.
Results o f regression analyses are included in Table 11. Standardized coefficients 
and significance o f all three sets o f equations are presented for comparison.
Scenario A
Equation one comprised of demographic variables was insignificant in explaining 
variances in ethical perceptions. Equation two was significant (p < .05). It explained 
9.7% o f the total variance in the dependent variable, ethical perceptions. The personal 
characteristic, relativism, was negatively associated with ethical perceptions. Situational 
variables were added in equation three. This equation increased R2 by .084 to a total R2 
o f .181. Relativism and attitude toward tax law changes relating to extension of 
attorney/client privilege to non-attorneys had significant negative relationships with 
perceptions that the action taken in Scenario A was unethical at p-value < .01. The final 
equation included moral intensity variables along with expectations o f IRS audits and 
additional assessments. The additional variables contributed substantially to the 
explanatory value o f the equation. Change in R2 was .258 bringing total R2 to .439. Six 
variables were significant at the p < .05 level. The extension o f attorney/client privilege 
and the moral intensity construct o f proximity were negatively related to the perception 
that the action taken was unethical. The moral intensity constructs o f seriousness o f 
consequences and social consensus along with conservatism and attitudes about a fund
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Table 11. Hierarchical Linear Regression Standardized Coefficients and Significance 
with Ethical Perception as Dependent Variable
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Independent Variable C oeff Sig. F. C oeff Sig. F. Coeff. Sig. F.
S teo  1
Age .008 .904 -.020 .741 -.004 .948
Education .079 .248 -.075 .257 .030 .663
1 lousehoid Income -.056 .412 -.227 .001** -.138 .043*
AR: .006 .681 .070 .000** .017 .237
S teo  2
Age -.049 .433 -.029 .636 -.051 .422
Education .033 .629 -.129 .056 .034 .621
H ousehold Income -.040 .545 -.241 .000** -.110 .104
Idealism .029 .646 -.073 .240 .113 .079
Relativism -.207 .003** -.167 .014* -.041 .558
Religiosity .043 .585 .227 .003** .001 .990
Conservatism .129 .127 -.155 .063 .158 .067
AR: .091 .057 .046
R: .097 .001** .127 .000** .063 .023*
S tep  3
Age -.065 .297 -.024 .693 -.029 .653
Education .000 .998 -.128 .058 .035 .617
H ousehold Income .033 .618 -.197 .004** -.061 .380
Idealism -.008 .895 -.097 .125 .063 .334
Relativism -.171 .014* -.123 .076 -.020 .777
Religiosity .066 .396 .268 .001** .041 .609
Conservatism .140 .092 -.146 .078 .174 .042*
Attitude Toward Paying Taxes . I I I .077 -.023 .714 -.069 .287
O versight Board .106 .139 .055 .442 .072 .324
Fund For Seminars For Low Income .110 .100 .098 .141 .168 .014*
Earners
A ttorney/Client Privilege for -.274 .000* * -.237 .001** -.180 .013*
Accountants
Shift in Burden o f  Proof .050 .540 -.061 .454 -.108 .193
C ost/Fees Recovery -.008 .935 .034 .709 .062 .517
IRS Em ployee to Contact Regarding .025 .762 . I I I .172 .027 .749
C orrespondence
A udit Selection Process Disclosure .008 .915 .012 .861 .138 .059
AR: .084 .056 .070
R: .181 .001** .183 .000** .133 .002**
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Table 11 -  Continued
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Independent Variable C oeff Sig. F. CoefT. Sig. F. CoefT. Sig. F.
Steo 4
Age -.083 .123 -.048 .290 -.005 .920
Education .016 .779 -.032 .522 .082 .145
Household Income .058 .318 -.061 .232 -.054 .349
Idealism -.044 .415 -.090 .058 .038 .472
Relativism -.085 .157 -.083 .103 .021 .717
Religiosity .026 .693 .163 .005** .053 .420
C onservatism .257 .000** -.032 .596 .202 .004**
A ttitude Toward Paying Taxes .055 .308 .193 .681 -.048 .357
O versight Board .061 .317 .051 .330 .039 .519
Fund For Seminars For Low Income 
Earners
.122 .031* .070 .151 .053 .343
A ttorney/Client Privilege for 
A ccountants
-.192 .002** -.105 .046* -.103 .084
Shift in Burden o f  P roof .064 .348 -.030 .617 -.069 .304
C ost/Fees Recovery -.014 .853 .038 .575 .024 .756
IRS Em ployee to Contact Regarding 
Correspondence
.015 .822 .065 .276 .074 .277
Audit Selection Process Disclosure -.005 .939 -.023 .663 .108 .065
Probability o f  Harm .079 .168 -.002 .965 .138 .024*
Seriousness o f  Consequences .125 .027* .284 .000** .058 .360
Social Consensus .423 .000** .462 .000** .456 .000**
Tem poral Immediacy .056 .318 .044 .393 .022 .717
Proxim ity -.130 .012* -.040 .412 -.106 .051
Expectation o f  Audit -.083 .151 -.073 .150 -.027 .635
Expectation o f  Assessment .012 .835 -.049 .320 -.070 .210
AR: .258 .395 .325
R2 .439 .000** .578 .000** .458 .000**
* = p < .05 *• = p < .01
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for tax clinics for low-income taxpayers were positively related to the perception that 
the action was unethical.
Scenario B
Equation one was significant at p < .001 and explained 7.0 % of the variance in 
perceptions of the ethical nature of the action taken in the scenario. Household income 
had a significant and negative relationship with the perceptions.
Equation two was significant at p < .001 .with an R2 o f . 127 or a change in R2 
of .057. While religiosity was positively and significantly (p-value <.001) associated 
with the perception that the action taken was unethical, household income (p-value < 
.001) and relativism (p-value < .05) were all negatively associated.
Situational variables were added in step three. This equation resulted in an R2 
increase o f .056. Religiosity had a positive relationship while household income, and 
attitudes about changes in the tax laws relating to extension o f  attorney/client privilege 
had negative relationships to the perception that the action taken was unethical.
Step four added the group of moral intensity variables along with expectations 
o f an IRS audit and additional assessments. The R2 change was .395 raising total R2 to 
.578. The final equation was significant at p < .001. The moral intensity dimensions 
of seriousness o f consequences and social consensus as well as religiosity had 
significant positive relationships with ethical perceptions. Extension of attorney/client 
privilege had a negative association with those perceptions.
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Scenario C
Equation one included demographic variables. Relationships between the 
independent variables and ethical perceptions o f the action taken in Scenario C were not 
significant.
Personal characteristic variables were added in step two. This equation was 
significant at p < .05. R2 change and total R2 were .046 and .063 respectively. 
Individually, none of the variables was significant in explaining variances in ethical 
perceptions.
Equation three added situational variables. The contribution of the additional 
variables was significant at p < .01. R2 change o f .07 increased total R2to .133. Attitudes 
about law changes related to creation of a fund for clinics for low-income taxpayer and 
extension o f attorney/client privilege along with the personal characteristic, conservatism, 
had positive relationships with the perception that the action taken was unethical.
The fourth step included the consequential variables o f moral intensity and 
expectations o f an IRS audit and additional assessments. The additional explanatory 
value was significant at p < .001. Moral intensity constructs o f probability o f harm and 
social consensus as well as the personal characteristic, conservatism, had positive and 
significant associations with the perception that the action taken was unethical at p < .05.
Other Regression Results
The relationship between the perceptions that the action taken was unethical and 
self-reported expected behavior in each scenario was evaluated using linear regression. 
Results o f  the analyses are presented in Table 12 and are discussed below.
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Ethical perceptions that the action taken in each vignette was unethical were 
significant in explaining variances in expected behaviors of respondents (p < .001). The 
portion o f variances explained was 46.6%, 53.4%, and 48.0% for Scenarios A, B, and C 
respectively.
Table 12. Linear Regression Standard Coefficients and Significance with Expected
Behavior as Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Standardized C oefficient R: F value Sig. F
Scenario A
Ethical Perception .682 .466 252.662 .000
Scenario B
Ethical Perception .731 .534 331.829 .000
Scenario C
Ethical Perception .693 .480 267.976 .000
Hypothesis Evaluation 
Hierarchical regression provided a basis for analyzing relationships among the 
various study variables. The following section presents a summary o f  the results o f this 
hypothesis testing.
Age, education, and household income were included in the hierarchical 
regression analysis as control variables and comprised block one o f the analysis. None 
of these variables were significant in explaining variances in ethical perceptions regarding 
noncompliant tax strategies across all three scenarios.
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Personal Characteristics
HI (not supported). Individuals who are highly idealistic are more likely to 
judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Hierarchical regression found no significant relationship between idealism and 
ethical perceptions o f noncompliant tax strategies. Therefore, the hypothesis was not 
supported.
H2 (not supported). Individuals who are highly relativistic are more likely to 
judge noncompliant tax strategies as ethical.
Hierarchical regression revealed no significant relationship between relativism and 
ethical perceptions in any of the three scenarios. The hypothesis was not supported.
H3 (partially supported). Individuals who are highly conservative are more 
likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Conservatism was found to be significant in explaining differences in ethical 
perceptions for Scenario A and Scenario C. In Scenario A, a taxpayer took a deduction 
to which he was not entitled based on his facts and circumstances. Scenario C involved 
a taxpayer who constructed bogus documentation for an audit. In both scenarios, highly 
conservative individuals judged the actions as unethical. This relationship was not 
significant in Scenario B in which a taxpayer took a deduction for which he was clearly 
entitled but for a technical violation in his documentation. This hypothesis was partially 
supported.
H4 (partially supported). Individuals who are highly religious are more likely 
to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
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In Scenario B, a taxpayer took a charitable deduction for a contribution he made 
during the year. His receipt, however, did not meet the technical requirements o f  the 
Internal Revenue Code which mandates possession of the receipt before filing a tax 
return. Regression analysis found a significant relationship between religiosity and ethical 
perceptions o f this action. While the action did not specifically deal with religious 
organizations, possibly, people who were very religious were more aware of the receipt 
requirement than the average taxpayer since they have been made aware o f the provision 
by the churches to which they donate. People may simply be willing to comply with tax 
laws with which they are familiar and understand. This finding was consistent with the 
finding that social consensus regarding the ethical perception o f the action taken affected 
ethical behavior. This relationship was not found in the other two vignettes. Therefore, 
the hypothesis was partially supported.
Personal Characteristics Summary
The block of personal characteristic variables was significant in explaining the 
differences in ethical perceptions across all three scenarios presented. Changes in R:*s 
were .091, .057, and .046 respectively for Scenarios A, B, and C (p < 0.05).
Situations
H5 (not supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward paying 
Federal income taxes are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
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No significant relationship was found between attitudes toward paying federal 
income taxes and ethical perceptions o f the actions in any o f the three scenarios. This 
hypothesis was not supported.
H6 (not supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to 
the IRS related to the creation o f an oversight board comprised of a majority of members 
who are not Treasury Department employees are more likely to judge noncompliant tax 
strategies as unethical.
Hierarchical regression found no significant relationship between positive attitudes 
toward the creation o f an oversight board for the IRS and ethical perceptions o f 
noncompliant tax strategies. This hypothesis was not supported.
H7 (partially supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward 
changes to the IRS related to the creation of a fund to sponsor tax clinics for low income 
taxpayers are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Those individuals who thought creation o f a fund to sponsor tax clinics for low- 
income earners was an effective change to the IRS, viewed the action taken in Scenario 
A regarding taking a home-office deduction to which the taxpayer was not entitled as 
unethical. No significant relationship was found in Scenarios B and C.
H8 (partially supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward 
changes to the IRS related to extension o f attomey-client privilege to non-attorneys such 
as accountants and enrolled agents are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies 
as unethical.
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Those individuals who had positive attitudes about extension o f attomey-client 
privilege to non-attorneys were less likely to judge the actions in the home office and 
charitable donation scenarios as unethical. The relationship was not significant in the 
bogus documentation scenario. The hypothesized relationship was partially supported, 
but in the direction opposite to that which was hypothesized.
H9 (not supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes to 
the IRS related to shifting the burden of proof, in certain circumstances, to the IRS are 
more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Hierarchical regression revealed no significant relationship between attitudes 
toward changes to the IRS related to shifting o f burden o f proof and ethical perceptions 
of the noncompliant actions taken in any of the three scenarios. This hypothesis was not 
supported.
H10 (not supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes 
to the IRS related to expansion o f circumstances under which taxpayers who successfully 
contest IRS positions may recover costs and fees are more likely to judge noncompliant 
tax strategies as unethical.
No significant relationship was indicated by regression analysis between attitudes 
about changes to the IRS related to cost and fee recoveries after a successful contest of 
an IRS position and ethical perceptions o f noncompliant behavior in any o f the scenarios 
presented. This hypothesis was not supported.
H ll (not supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes 
to the IRS related to a requirement for all non-computer generated IRS correspondence
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to include name, phone number, and unique identification number o f a specific IRS 
employee to contact are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
No significant relationship was found between attitudes about changes to the IRS 
related to a requirement to include a specific name, phone number, and identification 
number o f an IRS employee to contact regarding correspondence and ethical perceptions 
o f  noncompliant tax strategies. This hypothesis was not supported.
H12 (not supported). Individuals who have positive attitudes toward changes 
to the IRS related to a requirement that the IRS set forth criteria for audit selection and 
make this information available to the general public are more likely to judge 
noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Attitudes toward changes to the IRS regarding making available to the general 
public criteria for audit selection were not significant in explaining variances in ethical 
perceptions o f the actions taken in any of the three scenarios. This hypothesis was not 
supported.
Situational Variables Summary
Inclusion o f the block o f situational variables contributed significantly to 
explained variance in all three regression models. Changes in R2,s were .084, .056, and 
.070 respectively for Scenarios A, B, and C (p < 0.05). Total R2's were .181. .183, and 
.133.
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Consequences
H 13 (partially supported). Individuals who perceive a high probability o f harm 
from the action taken are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
In Scenario C, respondents who perceived a high probability of harm from 
fabricating support documents after notification of an IRS audit were more likely to judge 
the action taken as unethical. This relationship was not found to be significant in the 
scenarios involving home-office deductions or charitable donation receipts. This 
hypothesis was partially supported.
H14 (partially supported). Individuals who perceive that there are serious 
consequences from the action taken are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies 
as unethical.
Individuals who perceived that there were serious consequences from taking a 
home-office deduction (Scenario A) to which the taxpayer was not entitled and taking a 
charitable deduction (Scenario B) without appropriate receipts were more likely to judge 
the actions taken as unethical. Perception o f seriousness of consequences was not 
significant in explaining variances in ethical perceptions of creating bogus support for 
business mileage deductions. This hypothesis was partially supported.
H15 (supported). Individuals who perceive that there is social consensus 
regarding the ethical perception of the action taken are more likely to judge noncompliant 
tax strategies as unethical.
Individuals who perceive that there was social consensus regarding any harm from 
the actions taken in the three scenarios were more likely to judge those actions as
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unethical. The significant relationship was present across all scenarios. The actions taken 
were: (1) taking a deduction to which taxpayer is not entitled, (2) taking a deduction 
without required support, and (3) constructing bogus documentation only after 
notification of an IRS audit. Significance of F-value was .000 in all three situations. This 
hypothesis was supported.
H16 (not supported). Individuals who perceive that any harm from the action 
taken will occur sooner than later are likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as 
unethical.
Hierarchical regression found no significant relationship between those who 
thought any harm from the actions taken in the vignettes would occur sooner rather than 
later and their perceptions of the ethical nature of those actions. This hypothesis was not 
supported.
H17 (partially supported). Individuals who perceive that any harm from the 
action taken will affect those close to themselves are more likely to judge noncompliant 
tax strategies as unethical.
For Scenario A, those respondents who believed that any harm from the 
noncompliance action taken would affect those closer to them rather than those not as 
close were less likely to view the action taken as unethical. The relationship was 
insignificant in the regression o f the other two scenarios. This hypothesis was partially 
supported, but in the direction opposite to that which was expected.
H18 (not supported). Individuals who expect to be audited are more likely to 
judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
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No significant relationship was found between expectations of audits and 
perceptions regarding the ethical nature of the action taken in any of the three scenarios. 
This hypothesis was not supported.
H19 (not supported). Individuals who expect to be assessed additional taxes and 
penalties are more likely to judge noncompliant tax strategies as unethical.
Expectation of additional assessments if audited was not a significant variable in 
explaining variances in perceptions of the ethical nature o f the actions in any o f the 
scenarios presented. This hypothesis was not supported.
Consequential Variables Summary
The block of consequential variables was significant in explaining differences in 
ethical perceptions of actions taken in each o f the three scenarios. Changes in R2 were 
.258, .395, and .325 for Scenarios A, B. and C respectively (p < 0.05). Total portions of 
variances in ethical perceptions explained in Scenarios A, B, and C was 43.9%. 57.8%, 
and 45.8% respectively.
Behavioral Intentions
H20 (supported). Individuals who judge noncompliant tax strategies as 
unethical are more likely to intend to comply with income tax laws.
A positive relationship was found between perceptions that actions taken were 
unethical and expected behaviors in all scenarios. The relationship was significant (p < 
0.001) in each scenario. R2’s were .466, .534, and .480 for Scenarios A, B, and C, 
respectively. The influence o f ethical perceptions on expected behaviors was as expected.
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However, ethical perceptions explained only about one-half the variances in expected 
behaviors. Other undetected factors had significant influences on those expected 
behaviors also. This hypothesis was supported.
Summary
This chapter presented the results o f the research including descriptive statistics, 
factor analysis statistics, and hierarchical regression analysis. Tests o f hypotheses were 
also presented in this chapter. The following chapter presents conclusions of this research 
along with limitations o f the study.
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CONCLUSIONS
The purpose o f this chapter is to present overall conclusions and contributions o f 
this dissertation. Limitations o f the study and implications for further research are also 
presented. The first section summarizes the pertinent findings o f the study. The second 
section discusses the potential contributions of the study. Limitations o f the research are 
presented in the third section. The final section discusses the contributions of the study.
Summary of Significant Findings
Three scenarios were presented in which taxpayers engaged in noncompliant tax 
strategies. The relationships between survey respondents' ethical perceptions o f these 
actions and several groups o f potential explanatory variables were assessed. The groups 
o f variables included in the study were demographic variables, personal characteristics 
o f respondents, situational variables, and issue related variables.
None o f the demographic traits proved to be significant in explaining variances 
in the ethical perceptions o f the actions taken in the scenarios. O f the personal 
characteristic variables, idealism and relativism were not significant in explaining 
variances in perceptions o f actions taken in any of the scenarios. However, highly 
religious respondents perceived that taking a charitable contribution deduction without
93
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proper documentation was unethical. Religion was not significant in the other two 
scenarios. While no specific explanation presents itself, it was noteworthy that religious 
organizations benefit from the perceived unethical action taken. In Scenario A, taxpayer 
took a home office deduction to which he was not entitled based on his facts and 
circumstances. In Scenario C. taxpayer constructed bogus documentation for automobile 
mileage only after being notified o f an impending IRS audit. Highly conservative survey 
subjected judge these actions unethical.
An overall positive attitude about paying federal income taxes was not a factor in 
explaining ethical perceptions of the actions taken in the scenarios presented in the 
questionnaire. Other situational factors considered were impressions o f the effectiveness 
o f various recent tax law changes intended to make the IRS more responsive and user 
friendly. Seven law changes frcm the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform 
Act o f 1998 were included in the study. The relationships between respondents' 
impressions o f the effectiveness these changes and their perceptions o f the ethical nature 
o f the actions taken were analyzed. The results were inconsistent. Those respondents 
who thought that creating a fund to sponsor clinics for low-income taxpayers was an 
effective change believed that taking a home office deduction in the absence o f 
appropriate circumstances was unethical. The attitude toward this particular law change 
was not a factor in explaining ethical perceptions in the other vignettes. On the other 
hand, subjects who perceived that extension of attorney/client privilege to non-attorneys 
as an effective change viewed actions taken in the home office scenario and the charitable 
contribution scenario as less unethical than other respondents. Perhaps a feeling o f
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security based on the extended attorney/client privilege made the respondents less 
sensitive to potential consequences from noncompliance.
The final block of study variables was comprised o f the five dimensions o f the 
moral intensity scale developed by Barnett et al. (1999) along with respondents’ 
expectations of IRS audits and expectations of additional assessments, if  audited. 
Expectations of audits and additional assessments were not significant in explaining 
variances in ethical perceptions.
Proximity, the closeness o f the person harmed to the respondent, was significant 
in Scenario A, the home office deduction scenario, but not in the other scenarios. The 
probability o f harm was a significant factor in the bogus documentation vignette, but not 
in the others. Those individuals who believed that the consequences were serious, viewed 
actions taken in Scenarios A and B as unethical.
Respondents who believed there was social consensus that the actions taken were 
wrong believed that the actions taken in all scenarios were unethical. Kohlberg (1969), 
in his staged sequences of moral development, described three levels of moral 
development. In the preconventional stage, individuals’ behaviors are influenced by a 
need to avoid punishment. In the conventional stage individuals’ behaviors are motivated 
by a need to conform to societal expectations and live up to one’s duties and obligations. 
The findings of this study suggest taxpayers operate in the conventional stage. The 
relationship between perceptions o f social consensus and ethical judgments of 
noncompliance actions were consistent with a need to act for the good of society. This
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variable is significant in each scenario at the p < .001 level. Apparently, explanatory 
value o f social consensus crosses all circumstances presented.
The effect o f ethical perceptions on expected behaviors was studied in this 
research. Ethical perceptions were measured using the Reidenbach and Robin 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale. Expected behaviors were determined by responses to a 
self-reporting question. Ethical perceptions were significant in explaining expected 
behaviors in all scenarios at the p < .001 level. The percentages o f variance explained 
were 46.6%, 53.4%, and 48.0% for Scenarios A, B, and C respectively.
Potential Uses of Results 
Two of the characteristics o f a good tax system are perception of fairness and 
efficiency of administration (Pratt and Kulsrud 1999). With limited resources, focusing 
attention on the factors that are most significant in determining compliance rates would 
help the Internal Revenue Service achieve both o f these characteristics. This dissertation 
found that personal characteristics were of very little or no importance in resolving 
noncompliance dilemmas. On the other hand, the findings o f  this research indicated social 
consensus regarding noncompliance was significant in determining ethical perceptions 
at the most restrictive significance level. Based on this research, those ethical perceptions 
were also important determinants o f expected behavior in noncompliance dilemmas. 
Knowledge of these findings might be the catalyst for developing informational 
campaigns to educate the general public about the harmful results o f pervasive 
noncompliance. One possible harmful effect o f noncompliance with existing tax laws is
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that new taxes or higher rates of existing taxes would be necessary to achieve required 
revenue levels if wide-spread noncompliance persists.
Limitations o f Study 
This study was limited in several ways. These limitations may affect the 
interpretation o f the results and the generalizability o f the results to different populations. 
The effect o f the limitations should be considered in applying the outcomes o f this study 
to other circumstances.
Non-Response Bias
Two waves o f surveys were mailed to 3,109 addressees. From these survey 
subjects, 293 usable responses were received. Possible responses o f those recipients who 
did not complete the questionnaire can only be estimated. Analyses o f significant 
differences in responses between early responses and late responses were presented and 
discussed in Chapter 4. Statistical comparisons were presented in Table 5. If non­
respondents are similar to late respondents, the effects o f the moral intensity dimension 
of probability o f harm may be underestimated in the results o f the study. Similarly, the 
effects of respondents attitudes regarding the effectiveness o f the tax law changes related 
to the expansion o f circumstances in which taxpayers may recover costs from the IRS and 
the shift, in some situations, o f the burden o f proof to the IRS may be overstated. These 
possible effects should be taken into consideration in interpreting the results o f this study.
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Self-Reporting of Study Variables
Primary data were collected for this study using a self-reporting format. Socially 
desirable response may contaminate behavioral research causing misleading correlations. 
These responses tend to conform to cultural norms rather than represent the unbiased 
views o f  the respondents. The personal characteristic variables of idealism, conservatism, 
and religiosity correlated significantly with social desirability. The moral intensity 
dimensions o f seriousness o f consequences and proximity as well as behavioral intention 
in Scenario C also correlated significantly with social desirability. In Scenario A, 
seriousness o f consequences correlated with the social desirability measure. Assuring 
anonymity and allowing respondents to complete the survey in the non-threatening 
environment o f their own homes helped to mitigate possible effects of social desirability. 
However, potential distortion of relationships caused by these correlations should be taken 
into account when interpreting the results of this study.
Sample Size
The study questionnaire was mailed to 3,109 individuals who were likely, based 
on household income, to file a federal income tax return. The size o f the sample in 
relation to the population o f individual tax return filers, approximately one hundred 
million annually, does not provide a great deal o f power in generalizing the result of the 
sample to the entire population. Characteristics o f survey respondents were discussed in 
Chapter 4 and presented in Table 6.
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Research Design
Three scenarios were presented in the survey questionnaire. While the 
circumstances were selected to vary the ethical dilemmas and moral intensity, they 
represented only a small sampling of possible dilemmas faced by federal income tax 
filers. Accordingly, care should be taken in applying the results to other situations.
Use o f scenarios was an approximation o f reality. Actual behaviors in filing tax 
returns cannot be observed directly and, therefore, behavioral intentions were used as 
proxies for actions.
Contributions o f the Study 
This study contributed some insight into the effects o f moral intensity and personal 
traits on resolving ethical dilemmas in income tax filing situations. It also contributed to 
the understanding o f the effects of ethical perceptions on behavioral intentions in tax 
compliance circumstances. The findings of the study indicated that social consensus of 
possible harms from noncompliance significantly affects the ethical perception of 
noncompliant strategies. Findings also indicated that the perception that specific 
noncompliant actions are unethical affect individuals' expected behavior in similar 
circumstances. These findings, which have not been reported before, contributed 
meaningfully to the understanding of behavioral determinants in filing income tax returns.
Suggestions for Future Research 
This research suggests factors that affect behavioral decisions in federal income 
tax filing situations can be identified. Since knowledge o f these factors could lead to
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better compliance rates and more effective administration o f the income tax system, future 
research should strive to identify additional characteristics and circumstances that may 
affect compliance behaviors. While the relationships found in this study were significant, 
they explained only about half the variance in expected behaviors. Additional research 
could identify factors not examined in this study that might account for a greater portion 
of the variance.
Only three relatively narrow sets o f circumstances were utilized in this research. 
Others studies should test whether the identified relationships are consistent in a broader 
range o f situations.
Future studies should have larger sample sizes to improve the generalizability of 
the results to the entire population of federal income tax filers. Samples that include 
greater representation from demographic groups not adequately represented in this study 
would allow analyses o f differences in expected behaviors among those groups. 
Demographic categories o f gender, race, marital status, and employment would be among 
potential focuses for futures studies. Similar studies could, at a minimum, validate the 
results o f  this dissertation.
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Stanley W. Hays 
10019 Commander Dr. 
Shreveport, La. 71106
Survey Participant 
Address
Dear Survey Participant:
I am a candidate for my doctoral degree in accounting at Louisiana Tech University.
As part of the requirements for my degree, I must complete a study of newly gathered data 
on a significant topic. This data will be collected from only a small, scientific sample; 
therefore, your participation is critical to the success of this project. The enclosed survey is 
composed of questions concerning my research. I believe you will agree it involves issues 
important to the general public.
Recently you may have beard a great deal in the media about the income tax laws and the 
Internal Revenue Service. While much time and effort has been spent getting input from 
professional tax preparers and IRS employees, very little effort bas been made to solicit the 
opinions of the most important segment of our society, you, the American taxpayers.
Your participation is essential to the successful completion of this project and bringing 
into the debate the forgotten taxpayers. Please help by completing this survey. My analyses 
will be of a summary nature, so individual responses will not be identifiable with specific 
respondents.
I know you are very busy, so I have kept the survey as short as possible. However, 
gathering the appropriate data to most nearly reflect the views of the average taxpayer is 
essential. I appreciate your time and effort. Completion of the survey should take about 20 
minutes. Some wording and phrases may seem unusual, but in using recognized, validated 
measurement scales I am not at liberty to change any wording.
Your opinion is very important. Again, thank you for your time and effort.
Sincerely,
Stanley W. Hays
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AT L RESPONSES ARE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL
Section 1 Scenario A:
John  H arris operates his sole proprietorship out of his home. He completes many of his activities 
there, but meets no clients. He uses space in his home alternately for personal and business use and 
would like to take a “home office" deduction-depreciation and an allocable portion of utilities. He is 
aw are tha t current tax law does not allow a home office deduction unless the business use is exclusive 
in the p a rt of the home claimed. He can legally take no deductions for a home office. Since he prepares 
his own tax return, John takes the deductions anyway.
1. Please express your attitude toward the action taken by John on his return by placing a check (V) in a 
space between each of the opposite adjectives that follow.
fair _  
just _  
morally right _  
acceptable to my family _  
culturally acceptable _  
traditionally acceptable _  
violates an unwritten contract _  
violates an unspoken promise _
unfair
unjust
not morally right
unacceptable to my family
culturally unacceptable
traditionally unacceptable
does not violate an unwritten contract
does not violate an unspoken promise
2. Please rate John’s action on his tax return.
totally ethical ___:___ totally unethical
3. Please rate the likelihood that you would take the same action.
likely ___:___ :___ :_:___:____:_ unlikely
4. Please rate the likelihood that your neighbor would take the same action.
likely ___:___ :___ :_:___:____:_ unlikely
3. The likelihood that consequences to others will actually occur as a result of John’s action is...
likely ___
improbable 
impossible _  
definitely would _
unlikely
probable
possible
definitely would not
6. Do you believe any harm resulting from John’s action will be...
minor ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ severe
serious ___:___ :__ :___:___:___:__  trivial
significant ___:___ :__:___:___:___:__  insignificant
great ___:___ :__:___:___:___:__  slight
small ___:___ :__:___:___:___:__  large
7. Indicate the degree to which you feel society as a whole considers the action taken by John...
evil
ethical
legal
wrong
inappropriate
_  good 
_  unethical
  illegal
_  right 
  appropriate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
8. Do you anticipate that any consequences to others from John’s action are likely to occur.
immediately
never
quickly
belatedly
gradually
after a long time
soon
slowly
swiftly
rapidly
9. Compared to yourself, do you believe those potentially affected by John’s action arc...
similar 
not alike 
compatible 
close 
different
dissimilar
alike
incompatible
distant
same
Section 1 Scenario B:
Bob Dennis has made eight cash contributions to various charities this year.
Each donation was between S300 and SSOO and his only receipts are his canceled 
checks. Current Federal tax law states that no charitable deduction is allowed for 
any donation over $250 unless the taxpayer has a receipt from the charity which 
states the value of goods and services taxpayer received in consideration for the 
donation, if any. Specifically, the law provides that the receipt must be in the 
possession of the taxpayer before the deduction is taken on the return, not when 
notification of a subsequent audit is received. Bob takes the deduction without the 
required receipts.
10. Please express your attitude toward the action taken by Bob on his return by placing a check ( V) in 
a space between each of the opposite adjectives that follow.
fair _  
just _  
morally right _  
acceptable to my family _  
culturally acceptable _  
traditionally acceptable __ 
violates an unwritten contract _  
violates an unspoken promise _
unfair
unjust
not morally right
unacceptable to my family
culturally unacceptable
traditionally unacceptable
does not violate an unwritten contract
does not violate an unspoken promise
11. Please rate Bob’s action on his tax return.
totally ethical __ :___ :___:__ :___:__ :___  totally unethical
12. Please rate the likelihood that you would take the same action.
likely __ :___ :__ :__ :___:__ :___  unlikely
13. Please rate the likelihood that your neighbor would take the same action.
likely ___:___ :__ :__ :___:__ :___  unlikely
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14. The likelihood that consequences to others will actually occur as a result of Bob’s action is.
likely 
improbable 
impossible 
definitely would
unlikely
probable
possible
definitely would not
15. Do you believe any harm resulting from Bob’s action will be...
minor ___:___:___:___:___:___: severe
serious
significant
great
small
trivial
insignificant
slight
large
16. Indicate the degree to which you feel society as a whole considers Bob’s action.
evil
ethical
legal
wrong
inappropriate
good
unethical
illegal
right
appropriate
17. Do you anticipate that any consequences to others from Bob’s action are likely to occur.
immediately
never
quickly
belatedly
gradually
after a long time
soon
slowly
swiftly
rapidly
18. Compared to yourself, do you believe those potentially affected by Bob’s action are.
similar 
not alike 
compatible 
close 
different
  dissimilar
  alike
  incompatible
distant
same
Section 1 Scenario C:
Jim Moore uses his car frequently in his business. However, he does not keep 
adequate records to support a business deduction on his personal tax return. He 
takes a significant deduction for business mileage on his return each year. He has 
no specific recollection of the actual business use. Recently he received a notice that 
the IRS is going to audit last year’s return. In preparation for the audit Jim 
constructs a log of his business and personal mileage for the year in question. The 
log is designed to agree with the deduction taken but is not based on actual 
knowledge of legitimate business use. He uses several different pens to complete 
the log so it will appear that it was kept as the mileage was actually driven.
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19. Please express your attitude toward the action taken by Jim on his return by placing a check ( V) in a 
space between each of the opposite adjectives that follow.
fair
just ___
morally right ___
acceptable to my family _
culturally acceptable ___
traditionally acceptable _  
violates an unwritten contract _  
violates an unspoken promise _
unfair
unjust
not morally right
unacceptable to my family
culturally unacceptable
traditionally unacceptable
does not violate an unwritten contract
does not violate an unspoken promise
20. Please rate Jim’s action on his tax return.
totally ethical __ :___:___ :___:__ :___:__  totally unethical
21. Please rate the likelihood that you would take the same action.
likely __ :___:___ :___:___:___ :__  unlikely
22. Please rate the likelihood that your neighbor would take the same action.
likely __ :___:___ :___:__ :___ :___ unlikely
23. The likelihood that consequences to others will actually occur as a result of Jim’s action is...
likely 
improbable 
impossible 
definitely would
unlikely
probable
possible
definitely would not
24. Do you believe any harm resulting from Jim’s action will be...
minor ___:___:_:____ : : : severe
senous _  
significant _
great ___
small
trivial
insignificant
slight
large
25. Indicate the degree to which you feel society as a whole considers Jim’s action-
evil _  
ethical _  
legal _  
wrong _  
inappropriate __ :___
good
unethical
illegal
right
appropriate
26. Do you anticipate that any consequences to others from Jim’s action are likely to occur..
immediately ___
never _  
quickly _  
belatedly _  
gradually ___:___
after a long time
soon
slowly
swiftly
 :___ rapidly
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27. Compared to yourself, do you believe those potentially affected by Jim’s action are.
similar 
not alike 
compatible 
close 
different
dissimilar
alike
incompatible
distant
same
Section 2:
Please give your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by 
placing a check ( V) in a space between each of the opposite pairs below.
28. Federal income tax laws can be easily understood by the average American citizen.
strongly ag ree___ :___ :__ :___ :__ :___ :__ strongly disagree
29. There must be a Federal tax of some kind.
strongly a g ree__ :___:___ :___:__ :___:___ strongly disagree
30. The Internal Revenue Service should be abolished.
strongly ag ree___:____:__:___ :__:___ :__ strongly disagree
31. The IRS is generally fair in its assessment of taxes due.
strongly ag ree___:____:__ :___ :__:___ :__ strongly disagree
32. The IRS should be reorganized on a more “user friendly” basis.
strongly ag ree___:____:__:___ :__:___ :__ strongly disagree
33. The tax laws should place a greater burden on higher income earners.
strongly ag ree___:___ :__ :___ :__ :___ :___ strongly disagree
34. Electronic filing will solve most of the problems with the IRS.
strongly ag ree___:___ :__ :___ :__ :___ :___ strongly disagree
35. The income tax laws can be understood by the average IRS agent.
strongly ag ree  :___ :__ :___ :__ :___ :___strongly disagree
36. The IRS is reasonable in its tactics to collect Federal taxes due.
strongly ag ree  :___ :__:___ :__:___ :__  strongly disagree
37. Low income earners should pay some amount of income tax.
strongly ag ree  :___ :__ :___ :__:___ :__  strongly disagree
38. Our Federal income tax laws are as reasonable as they can be.
strongly ag ree  :___ :__:___ :__:___ :__  strongly disagree
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Section 3:
Following is a list of statements about paying Federal income taxes.
Place a plus (+) before each statement with which you agree (with reference to paying Federal 
income taxes.)
  39. Paying income taxes should be practiced by all citizen.
  40. Paying income taxes aids in bringing civilization to a higher level.
  41. Paying income taxes is endorsed by sensible people.
  42. Many things about paying income taxes are essential to normal living.
  43. Paying income taxes keeps us from being “one-sided.”
  44. As a rule paying income taxes is good.
  45. Paying income taxes has more merit than demerit
  46. I would enjoy paying income taxes if it were changed somewhat.
  47. I am not against paying income taxes, but neither am I for it.
  48. Paying income taxes isn’t absolutely bad but isn’t good either.
  49. Paying income taxes is a little foolish.
  50. Paying income taxes has more disadvantages than advantages.
  51. Paying income taxes is annoying.
  52. We would be better off without paying income taxes.
  53. Paying income taxes is not endorsed by sane people.
  54. Paying income taxes serves no purpose.
  55. I hate paying income taxes worse than I hate anything else.
Section 4:
Instructions: Below is a series of statements designed to allow you to indicate the extent to which 
you agree with each statement. In answering, use the following response scale and write the 
number corresponding to your level of agreement with each statement in the space provided 
beside that statement.
Completely Moderately Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Moderately Completely 
Disagree Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree
i 2 3 4 5 6 7
 56. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even
to a small degree.
 57. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might
be.
 58. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits
to be gained.
 59. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
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Completely Moderately Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Moderately Completely 
Disagree Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree
i 2 3 4 5 6 7
60. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and 
welfare of another individual.
,61. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
,62. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the 
act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
,63. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any society.
.64. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
65. Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most “perfect” action.
_66. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any 
code of ethics.
_67. What is ethical varies from one situation to another.
_68. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be 
moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.
_69. Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to “rightness”.
_70. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or 
immoral is up to the individual.
_71. Moral standards are simple personal rules which indicate how a person should 
behave and are not to be applied in making judgments of others.
_72. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals 
should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
_73. Rigidly codifying an ethical option that prevents certain types of actions could stand 
in the way of better human relations and adjustment.
_74. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not 
permissible totally depends upon the situation.
_75. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances 
surrounding the action.
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Section 5:
Following hearings into perceived abuses by the Internal Revenue Service, Congress passed The Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Please indicate your impression of the effect of the 
following specific provisions of the Act on the relationship of the IRS with the taxpaying public. Place a 
check (V) in a space between each of the opposite pairs below.
76. The creation of an oversight board to review the Service’s administration of Federal income tax 
compliance. The majority of the board are not employees of the IRS, the Treasury Department, or any 
other government agency.
much worse ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ much better
77. The creation of a fund to provide grants to sponsor clinics for low income taxpayers.
much worse ___:___:___: much better
78. Extension of attomey-client privilege to non-attorney tax professionals such as accountants 
and enrolled agents.
much worse ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ much better
79. The shifting of the burden of proof, in certain circumstances, in civil tax disputes from the 
taxpayer to the IRS.
much worse ___:___:___:___:___:___:___ much better
80. The expansion of the circumstances under which taxpayers who successfully contest IRS 
positions may recover costs and fees.
much worse ___:___ :___ :__ :___:___:__  much better
81. Any manually prepared notice from the IRS must contain, in a prominent manner, the name, 
phone number, and unique identifying number of the IRS employee that the recipient may 
contact regarding the notice.
much worse ___:___:___ :__ :___:___:__  much better
82. The IRS must set forth the criteria for selecting returns for audit. This information must be 
made available to the general public.
much worse ___:___: much better
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Section 6:
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements by placing a 
number beside each item.
Completely
Disagree
Moderately Slightly 
Disagree Disagree
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree
Slightly Moderately Completely 
Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
83. Flag burning 91. Heavy metal music
84. Chastity 92. ROTC
85. Legalized abortion 93. Strip shows
86. Premarital virginity 94. Evolution theory
87. Casual sex 95. Female clergv
88. Church authority 96. Fundamental religion
89. Punk rockers 97. Bible truth
90. Patriotism 98. Divorce
Section 7:
Please indicate your best response to the following statements by placing a check ( V) in a space 
between each of the opposite pairs below..
99. My religion is very important to me.
strongly disagree ___:___ :__ :___:__:____:____ strongly agree
100. I believe in God.
strongly disagree ___:___ :__ :___:__:____:____ strongly agree
101. How often do you attend church services/meetings?
Once Once Once More than 
Never a vear a month a week once a week
102. What percentage of your after taxes income do you donate to your denomination or other 
ministries?
0% _____ 1-3%______4-7% _______8-10%  >10%______
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103. Indicate how religious you consider yourself:
very moderately slightly not at all anti-
religious religious religious religious religious
104. Please indicate your current religious denomination or sect __________________________
Section 8:
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item 
and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. Circle either true
(T) or false (F).
T F 105. I like to gossip at times.
T F 106. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
T F 107. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
T F 108. I always practice what I preach.
T F 109. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
T F 110. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
T F 111. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
T F 112. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
T F 113. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
T F 114. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
Section 9:
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements by placing a 
(V) in a space between each of the opposite pairs that follow.
 115. The probability I will be audited by the IRS within the next five years is...
highly unlikely ___:___:___:___:___:___:____  highly likely
 116. If audited, the probability I will be assessed additional taxes is...
highly unlikely ___:___:___:____ :_:____:___ highly likely
 117. If audited, the probability I will be assessed interest and penalties is...
highly unlikely ___:___:___:____ :_:____ :___ highly likely
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Section 10:
118. Age: ____________
119. Gender.  female  male
120. Please indicate your race (check one).
1 .  A frican-A m erican 3 .______ Asian-Americaa 5 .______ O th e r
2 . ______Hispanic o r  Latino 4 .  W hite Specify
121. Marital Status: _____ m arried
 single (divorced)
My employment is best described as (check one):
122 .____  Professional, technical, and  mechanical
123 .____  C lerical and sales
124 ._____ Service
125 .____  A gricultural, fishery, fo restry , and related
126 .____  Processing
132. Please indicate the highest level o f  education you have obtained (check one).
 1-11 years _____  high school d ip lom a
 some college _____ college degree
 some postgraduate/professional education _____  advanced degree
Ij j . Please indicate the approximate level o f your annual household income. _______________
134. I have been audited by the IRS in the past. _____ Yes  No
135. Do you claim any dependents (other than yourself and/or your spouse on your tax return?
 Yes  No
136. Who prepared your return last year?
 I prepared my own return.
 A friend or family member prepared my return without charge.
 1 paid someone to prepare my return.
 I was not required to file a return.
137. I reside in the state o f _____________________•
single (never m arried ) 
single (widowed)
127 .____M achine trad es
128 .____B enchw ork
129 .____S tru c tu ra l w ork
130 .____M iscellaneous
131 .____ Not w orking
THANKS SO MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT 
YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL 
PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE 
IN THE RETURN POST-PAID ENVELOPE AND MAIL PROMPTLY
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Testimony Before the Senate Finance Committee 
September 24,1997
Taxpayers
Mrs. Hicks
A Mrs. Hicks detailed a nine year saga of blatant abuse by the IRS collection 
division. Mrs. Hicks, a divorced mother o f a teenage daughter was notified in 1988 
that additional taxes had been assessed on her 1983 tax return. In that year, she had 
filed a joint return with her then husband from whom she was divorced at the time of 
the notice. The collection division refused to examine her records. Subsequently she 
filed a petition in the Tax Court. After an examination of her records, an out-of-court 
settlement was reached in the amount o f $2,709. With interest and penalties the total 
due was $3,500 which Mrs. Hicks offered to pay on the spot. The IRS refused the 
payment stating that no account was set up showing the amount due and she would 
receive a bill in about six weeks without any additional interest and penalties. When 
no such bill was forthcoming, she contacted the IRS, but was told they had no record 
she owed any taxes. Later she learned that there is more than one computer system 
for the IRS and that a separate account had been set up in her name only, not a joint 
account for 1983 when she had filed with her now ex-husband.
At the time the assessment arose, Mrs. Hicks was engaged to another man whom 
she later married. When Mrs. Hicks remarried, the IRS filed a lien against her new 
husband’s home, which had been his separate property for six years before his 
marriage to the taxpayer against whom the IRS had an outstanding assessment for a
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total at the time of $6,161. Mrs. Hicks’ ex-husband informed her that he had paid the 
entire assessment against the joint return for 1983. The IRS collection division 
acknowledged it was aware of his payments, but could not discuss his affairs with her 
even though they had filed a joint return. Later, the IRS levied her current husband’s 
salary on the basis it was community property-leaving the couple only $18 per week 
on which to live. To protect their livelihood, Mrs. Hicks’ husband set up a separate 
residence and divorced her. When notified of the new marital status the IRS refiled 
the existing lien against the husband with full knowledge that he was no longer 
married to Mrs. Hicks, who owed the tax which they were attempting to collect. By 
this time, the total due was over $8,000.
Mrs. Hicks next contacted a Problems Resolution Officer, an ombudsman for 
taxpayers. After some inquiries, the officer concluded that no taxes were, in fact, due, 
and the amount due would be set to zero. While that was being done, no further 
collection activities were to take place. A few days later the officer called back and 
said she had changed her mind and that there was nothing she could do.
In order to save her husband’s house from foreclosure, they decided to pay the 
total assessment including interest and penalties. Accordingly, she delivered a 
cashier’s check in the amount of $8,194.73 to the IRS. The check included Mrs. 
Hicks name, social security number, and tax year to which the payment was to be 
applied. The payment was posted instead to her 1990 return, a joint return with her 
most recent husband. Apparently this was another result of the dual computer system.
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No outstanding balance was shown due for her 1983 return so the payment was posted 
to another year.
In desperation, Mrs. Hicks wrote to Senator William Roth, chairman of the Senate 
Finance committee regarding her plight. The letter led to her testimony before the 
committee. Within a short period of time after Senator Roth’s involvement, the IRS 
released all liens and returned Mrs. Hicks’ money to her (Hicks 1997).
Mr. Tom Savage
Mr. Tom Savage was the owner of a construction company, Tom Savage 
Associates (TSA). When the IRS was unable to collect employment taxes from a 
subcontractor o f TSA, they created a fictitious joint venture between the subcontractor 
and TSA complete with a new taxpayer identification number. Now claiming that the 
employees were working for this fictitious partnership, the IRS attempted to collect 
the tax from TSA since the other “partner” did not have the means to pay. However, 
there was no outstanding assessment for either TSA or the fictitious partnership. The 
IRS then seized a check from one of TSA’s clients in the amount of $150,000. 
Because TSA needed the money to pay its bills, they negotiated a settlement with the 
IRS allowing the service to keep $50,000 even though no tax was owed by TSA. The 
lien against the check was illegal since even the IRS’s asserted tax was in the name of 
the subcontractor. No assessment had ever been made in the name of TSA. The IRS 
later claimed that there was, in fact, an assessment against the fictitious partnership; 
however, this assessment was dated 25 weeks after the seizure of TSA’s check. In
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addition to the $50,000 which the IRS kept, TSA incurred over $51,000 in legal fees 
and lost an estimated $600,00 in business (Savage 1997).
Monsienor Ballweg
Monsignor Ballweg was a retired Catholic Priest who spent about half his time in 
New York and half in Florida. He was also trustee of a trust set up by his mother. 
Among his duties was filing an annual tax return for the trust.
For 1995, he filed the return and included all the income including an attached 
schedule for stock trades. M. Ballweg was not an experienced tax preparer and 
apparently did not clearly reference the supporting schedules. The IRS requested that 
he put all trades on the appropriate forms which he did hurriedly to meet their short 
deadline. Based on this second filing, some income was counted twice and an 
additional tax of $18,000 was assessed. He requested from the agent a copy of the 
original return, but was told he had to make a request on the appropriate form-which 
he did. The request was denied on the basis that the request was signed by Lawrence 
F. Ballweg while the original return was signed by Lawrence F. Ballweg, Trustee 
under the will of Elizabeth D. Ballweg. He wrote back to explain that he was one and 
the same person, but the IRS merely sent him a final notice of deficiency and informed 
him that if the deficiency was not paid they would seize his bank accounts, cars, and 
any other property. He next wrote to Senator Roth and was subsequently featured on 
CNN. The next day he was contacted by the IRS and provided a copy of the 
requested return and was assisted by the IRS in properly completing the required form. 
No tax was due (Ballweg 1997).
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Mrs. Jacobs
The last witness testified to a 17 year nightmare involving confusing employer 
identification numbers (EIN). Mrs. Jacobs worked in her husband's optometry 
practice. When he relocated his practice she believed he needed a new EIN. With the 
help of an IRS employee she filed the appropriate form. Based on this application the 
practice was issued a “new" EIN which, it was later learned, turned out to belong to 
another individual with a similar name. For some unexplained reason a third number 
was issued two years later. Without any inquiry from the IRS, the Jacobs received a 
notice o f $11,000 tax due. They repeatedly asked the IRS to explain how the 
deficiency was determined, but got no information from the service. Without 
understanding the origin of the amount due, but intimidated by IRS collection tactics, 
they agreed to pay the service $250 per week until the $11,000 was paid in full. After 
paying the deficiency the Jacobs, again without any contact from the IRS, received an 
additional notice for $15,000.
In 1982, after the Jacobs contacted their congressional representative, the IRS 
informed the Jacobs that they had already received refund checks. However, the 
service could never produce copies of the checks alleged to have been sent. In 1987 
they again contacted their representative, again heard from the IRS, but still no 
resolution was reached. With the assistance of an attorney, the Jacobs finally realized 
in 1992 that the confusion had been caused by the existence o f three EIN’s, but still 
could not get their money back from the IRS. Pursuant to a third call to their 
congressman, the Jacobs finally were put in contact with a sympathetic IRS employee.
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Unfortunately, she became ill before the problem was resolved. Out of sheer 
frustration, the Jacobs went to the newspaper in 1997 and told their story. Within two 
hours they were contacted by an IRS employee. This employee admitted the IRS was 
at fault and that all liens would be removed. She faxed the Jacobs a letter stating that 
the liens would be released and acknowledged that the taxes due were from a different 
Dr. and Mrs. Jacobs. No mention was made of the erroneously collected taxes. As 
of the date of testimony the Jacobs had received no refund (Jacobs 1997).
Anonymous IRS Employees
On September 25, 1997, the Senate Finance Committee heard testimony from six 
current and former IRS employees about abusive practices by IRS employees. For 
fear of retribution, the witnesses provided their credentials to a staff member of each 
of the major political parties but otherwise were identified only as witness no. 1, 
witness no. 2, etc. Noteworthy is the fact that only one was a revenue officer, the type 
of personnel most likely to have initial contact with taxpayers. The other witnesses 
were from the Collections Division, the IRS Internal Security Division, and the 
Inspection Division. While their specific stories varied, there were some common 
themes. The Internal Revenue Code does not abuse taxpayers. The complicated 
code may cause some seemingly unfair circumstances, but “taxpayer abuse occurs 
only when the IRS improperly and sometimes illegally uses its vast powers’'. IRS 
employees improperly trained in IRS policies and Internal Revenue Manual 
procedures cause much of the taxpayer abuse. Rarely do managers take corrective 
action when their subordinates misapply IRS policy or procedures. In fact, many
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revenue officers leam the general perception from managers “that most tax debtors are 
trying to cheat the government” (Witness no. 1 1997).
Even when the IRS realizes it has served a levy in error, it often takes the position 
that when the taxpayer provides additional information, it will “consider” releasing the 
lien. Often when a taxpayer forgets to supply a single item from a long list requested 
by the IRS, an aggressive approach to collection is taken such as a paycheck or bank 
account levy. The IRS frequently “punishes” taxpayers because the revenue officer or 
manager feel the taxpayer did not obey their commands appropriately. 
Recommendations for the collections division include making IRS personnel follow 
the Internal Revenue Manual as if it were law and holding managers accountable for 
violations of procedures (Witness no. 1 1997).
The witness from the Internal Security Division believes much of the hindrance of 
internal investigations is caused by a lack of independence and a management bent on 
avoiding bad press regarding employee behavior at a time the agency’s public image is 
at a low point. The treasury department is unionized. The IRS is aware of the 
administration’s view on unions; accordingly, high level Internal Security Division 
personnel do not want to take on cases involving union employees. Internal Security 
Division employees are statistics conscience. Cases involving non-employees only 
gets a “stat” when there is judicial action. A case involving armed militia gets less 
credit than an IRS employee misusing a government car (Witness no. 2 1997). 
Apparently the original mission of the collection division has become incidental to the 
production of statistics. A case written off as uncollectable is counted as a case closed
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just the same as if it were fully collected. In some months, over 60 percent of case 
closures are write-offs--accounts considered to be uncollectable (Witness no. 3 1997). 
One witness who claimed to be collecting more money and having a higher than 
average rate of cases collected in full, felt that he was now being evaluated on number 
of seizures rather than overall effectiveness (Witness no. 5 1997). Another testified 
that in the 1980’s IRS instructions included a block which stated that it was acceptable 
to lie or mislead as long as it accomplished the goals of the agency. He, too, felt the 
message was to sacrifice quality for the sake of numbers (Witness no. 6 1997).
Browsing, the unauthorized access to taxpayer records, and unauthorized release of 
taxpayer information receives nothing more than a counseling letter (Witness no. 2 
1997). Browsing has many motivations including looking up tax records of former 
spouses, boyfriends, girlfriends, famous people, relatives of taxpayers resisting 
collection, merely ones who are perceived as not being cooperative or even someone 
with whom an IRS employee is having a personal disagreement. Still other cases 
involve potential witnesses in tax cases or jurors sitting on tax cases (Witness no 3 
1997).
Microphones have been found in IRS employee lounges. Employees have been 
instructed by managers to tape other employees’ conversations without their 
knowledge. This type of action is most often taken when a manager does not like a 
particular employee and is looking for any excuse to discipline him or her. Listening 
devices have also been placed in conference rooms used by taxpayers and their 
representatives (Witness no. 3 1997).
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Collection policy is inconsistent. One taxpayer may be allowed to make monthly 
payments while another in similar circumstances is put out o f business or forced into 
bankruptcy. One taxpayer’s account may be written off as uncollectable, while 
another’s is aggressively pursued. Property seized from a taxpayer is auctioned off 
subject to a minimum bid. Often the property is sold for far less than the minimum 
bid. In one instance, property with a minimum bid of $40,000 based on its value was 
sold for only $7,000-a clear violation of departmental policy (Witness no. 4 1997).
Travel expenses are frequently abused. Managers often schedule their business 
travels to coincide with their vacation plans. Managers often plan their business trip 
to end up at their vacation site at government expense (Witness no. 4 1997). 
Inspection managers were attending a week long meeting on St. Simon Island at a time 
agents were being told there were no travel funds to perform inspections involving 
over-night travel (Witness no. 6 1997).
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TABLE C .l 
Correlation Matrix-Scenario A
EP(A) BEH(A) PH(A) SRC(A) SOC(A) TEM(A) PRX(A) IDE
EP(A) 1.000
BEH(A) .682
.000
1.000
PH(A) .198
.001
.041
.489
1.000
SRC(A) .258
.000
.270
.000
.238
.000
1.000
SOC(A) .527
.000
.413
.000
.169
.004
.119
.042
1.000
TEM(A) .059 .026 .275 .328 -.080 1.000
.316 .653 .000 .000 .174
PRX(A) -.170 -.190 -.072 -.092 -.160 .002 1.000
.003 .001 .219 .115 .006 .970
IDE .015 .040 .089 .076 .001 -.023 -.042 1.000
.795 .502 .133 .195 .983 .702 .473
RLV -.253 -.298 .060 -.177 -.097 .030 -.088 .050
.000 .000 .313 .003 .100 .609 .139 .402
CSV .189 .227 -.026 .030 -.095 -.053 .019 .176
.001 .000 .661 .620 .111 .375 .744 .003
RLG. .122 .198 -.019 .135 -.079 -.035 -.040 .170
.038 .001 .747 .022 .179 .557 .499 .004
ATT .144 .088 .087 .073 .094 -.035 -.027 .128
.014 .132 .139 .211 .109 .556 .646 .029
OVS .099 .096 .040 .017 .099 -.126 -.020 .099
.094 .102 .500 .768 .092 .032 .737 .092
LIN .079 -.010 .032 .025 .009 -.011 .024 .214
.181 .871 .591 .676 .882 .854 .690 .000
PRV -.225 -.125 -.186 -.123 -.107 -.075 .069 .006
.000 .033 .002 .036 .069 .200 .243 .919
BPR .023 .025 -.058 -.027 .060 -.116 .078 -.041
.698 .667 .328 .649 .307 .048 .187 .492
CFS .051 .031 -.037 -.073 .091 -.135 .070 .023
.390 .596 .527 .214 .121 .021 .234 .700
IRS .067 .077 -.057 .008 .106 -.137 .075 .043
.255 .193 .334 .892 .071 .020 .200 .468
ASL -.011 .004 -.068 -.012 .026 -.038 -.003 .123
.856 .951 .247 .838 .655 .522 .959 .036
ADX -.060 .050 -.114 .054 -.011 -.016 .005 -.110
.309 .394 .053 .361 .852 .787 .936 .061
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EP(A) BEH(A) PH(A) SRC(A) SOC(A) TEM(A) PRX(A) IDE
ASX -.065 .003 -.019 -.013 -.083 -.028 .070 -.173
.271 .961 .746 .823 .158 .631 .238 .003
AGE .009 -.007 .136 .054 -.007 -.073 -.078 .109
.875 .908 .021 .360 .899 .213 .187 .064
EDU .068 .157 -.090 .024 .018 .080 .064 -.177
.249 .007 .126 .689 .759 .174 .275 .002
INC -.035 .042 -.067 -.114 .010 .057 .030 -.141
.573 .498 .274 .062 .867 .352 .630 .021
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RLV CSV RLG ATT OVS LIN PRV BPR
EP(A)
BEH(A)
PH(A)
SRC(A)
SOC(A)
TEM(A)
PRX(A)
IDE
RLV 1.000
CSV .375 1.000
.000
RLG -.232 .624 1.000
.000 .000
ATT .095 -.010 .003
.108 .871 .962
OVS -.031 .078 .043
.737 .092 .598
LIN .097 -.055 .033
.100 .359 .582
PRV .114 .000 .109
.054 .998 .065
BPR -.076 -.007 .036
.199 .907 .543
CFS -.056 .016 -.020
.342 .795 .734
IRS -.046 -.017 -.054
.435 .775 .365
ASL .069 -.061 -.028
.241 .305 .642
1.000
.183 1.000
.188 .471
.116 .219 1.000
.047 .000
.074 .324 .261 1.000
.211 .000 .000
.010 .389 .199 .459
.869 .000 .001 .000
.019 .431 .148 .390
.745 .000 .011 .000
.055 .384 .259 .282
.352 .000 .000 .000
.006 .299 .273 .262
.922 .000 .000 .000
1.000
.637
.000
.451
.000
.386
.000
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RLV CSV RLG ATT OVS LIN PRV BPR
ADX -.071 .007 .074 -.103 .054 -.013 .063 .052
.228 .902 .208 .078 .360 .820 .282 .382
ASX .005 -.006 -.050 -.010 .066 -.065 .047 -.031
.938 .914 .393 .868 .266 .270 .429 .605
AGE -.085 .187 .108 .090 .145 -.062 .022 .154
.154 .002 .068 .126 .013 .294 .708 .009
EDU -.247 -.100 -.012 .033 .056 -.034 .039 .119
.000 .091 .843 .573 .337 .563 .503 .042
INC -.085 -.089 -.024 -.157 .058 -.135 .134 .118
.169 .152 .696 .010 .347 .027 .029 .054
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CFS IRS ASL ADX ASX AGE EDU
EP(A)
BEH(A)
PH(A)
SRC(A)
SOC(A)
TEM(A)
PRX(A)
IDE
RLV
CSV
RLG
ATT
OVS
LIN
PRV
BPR
CFS 1.000
IRS .643 1.000
.000
ASL .445 .427 1.000
.000 .000
ADX .000 .046 .033
.993 .439 .582
INC
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CFS IRS ASL ADX ASX AGE EDU
ASX -.056 -.014 -.018 .457 1.000
.340 .811 .761 .000
AGE .130 .037 -.020 -.101 -.010 1.000
.027 .533 .734 .087 .870
EDU .077 -.028 -.016 .105 .014 -.074 1.000
.193 .632 .782 .074 .809 .208
INC .072 .028 -.067 .240 .110 -.021 .375
.242 .646 .274 .000 .073 .730 .000
TABLE C.2
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Correlation M atrix-Scenario B
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EP(B) BEH(B) PH(B) SRC(B) SOC(B) TEM(B) PRX(B) IDE
EP(B) 1.000
BEH(B) .731 1.000
.000
PH(B) .360 .257 1.000
.000 .000
SRC(B) .520 .432 .444 1.000
.000 .000 .000
SOC(B) .650 .544 .410 .386 1.000
.000 .000 .000 .000
TEM(B) .223 .248 .402 .457 .178 1.000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .002
PRX(B) -.324 -.359 -.131 -.313 -.349 -.171 1.000
.000 .000 .026 .000 .000 .003
IDE -.015 .016 -.021 .061 .010 -.107 -.023 1.000
.801 .789 .721 .298 .866 .069 .700
RLV -.096 -.154 .030 -.028 -.008 .068 -.038 .050
.104 .009 .617 .637 .896 .247 .521 .402
CSV .088 .105 -.019 .091 -.059 -.023 .012 .176
.139 .077 .756 .125 .318 .694 .839 .003
RLG .143 .182 .026 .140 -.022 -.023 -.015 .170
.015 .002 .662 .017 .708 .703 .801 .004
ATT -.004 .016 -.025 -.010 -.019 -.098 .073 .128
.945 .781 .674 .870 .741 .094 .216 .029
OVS .010 -.014 .041 -.007 -.032 -.106 .102 .099
.867 .816 .489 .904 .591 .070 .082 .092
LIN .068 .003 .065 .050 .007 -.017 -.006 .214
.246 .965 .272 .401 .912 .767 .925 .000
PRV -.211 -.189 -.130 -.149 -.187 -.083 .069 .006
.000 .001 .027 .011 .001 .159 .239 .919
BPR -.049 -.114 -.057 -.099 -.014 -.113 .090 -.041
.403 .053 .334 .091 .809 .055 .127 .492
CFS .019 -.104 -.089 -.067 .001 -.109 .092 .023
.746 .078 .131 .255 .993 .063 .118 .700
IRS .084 .026 -.026 .022 .023 -.062 .030 .043
.155 .661 .663 .708 .702 .293 .610 .468
ASL .024 -.067 .075 .069 .017 .013 .035 .123
.689 .252 .203 .245 .775 .829 .551 .036
ADX -.069 -.007 -.008 .080 -.036 .104 -.049 -.110
.240 .900 .886 .174 .540 .077 .408 .061
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE C.2 (Continued)
132
EP(B) BEH(B)
ASX -.078 .071
.189 .230
AGE .019 .021
.752 .726
EDU -.171 -.061
.003 .297
INC -.247 -.165
.000 .007
PH(B) SRC(B) SOC(B)
.027 .001 -.040
.653 .983 .494
.064 .060 .051
.277 .309 .386
-.161 -.200 -.142
.006 .001 .015
-.135 -.261 -.150
.027 .000 .014
TEM(B) PRX(B) IDE
.104 -.049 -.110
.428 .881 .003
-.033 .020 1.09
.572 .738 .064
-.046 .102 -.177
.434 .082 .002
-.019 .108 -.141
.755 .078 .021
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RLV CSV RLG ATT OVS LIN PRV BPR
EP(B)
BEH(B)
PH(B)
SRC(B)
SOC(B)
TEM(B)
PRX(B)
IDE
RLV 1.000
CSV -.375 1.000
.000
RLG -.232 .625 1.000
.000 .000
ATT .095 -.010 .003 1.000
.108 .871 .962
OVS -.031 .078 .043 .183 1.000
.598 .188 .471 .002
LIN .097 -.055 .033 .166 .219 1.000
.100 .359 .582 .047 .000
PRV .114 .000 .109 -.074 .324 .261 1.000
.054 .998 .065 .211 .000 .000
BPR -.076 -.007 .036 .010 .389 .199 .459 1.000
.199 .907 .543 .869 .000 .001 .000
CFS -.056 .016 -.020 .019 .431 .148 .390 .637
.342 .795 .734 .745 .000 .011 .000 .000
IRS -.046 -.017 -.054 .055 .384 .259 .282 .451
.435 .775 .365 .352 .000 .000 .000 .000
ASL .069 -.061 -.028 .006 .299 .273 .262 .386
.241 .305 .642 .922 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADX -.071 .007 .074 -.103 .054 -.013 .063 .052
.228 .902 .208 .078 .360 .820 .282 .382
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RLV CSV RLG ATT OVS LIN PRV BPR
ASX .005 -.006 -.050 -.010 .066 -.065 .047 -.031
.938 .914 .393 .868 .266 .270 .429 .605
AGE -.085 .187 .108 .090 .145 -.062 .022 .154
.154 .002 .068 .126 .013 .294 .708 .009
EDU -.247 -.100 -.012 .033 .056 -.034 .039 .119
.000 .091 .843 .573 .337 .563 .503 .042
INC -.085 -.089 .024 -.157 .058 -.135 .134 .118
.169 .152 .696 .010 .347 .027 .029 .054
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CFS IRS ASL ADX ASX AGE EDU
EP(B)
BEH(B)
PH(B)
SRC(B)
SOC(B)
TEM(B)
PRX(B)
IDE
RLV
CSV
RLG
ATT
OVS
LIN
PRV
BPR
CFS 1.000
IRS .643 1.000
.000
ASL .445 .427 1.000
.000 .000
ADX .000 .046 .033
.993 .439 .582
INC
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CFS IRS ASL
ASX -.056 -.014 -.018
.340 .811 .761
AGE .130 .037 -.020
.027 .533 .734
EDU .077 -.028 -.016
.193 .632 .782
INC .072 .028 -.067
.242 .646 .274
ADX ASX AGE EDU
.457 1.000
.000
-.101 -.010 1.000
.087 .870
.105 .014 -.074 1.000
.074 .809 .208
.240 .110 -.021 .375
.000 .073 .730 .000
INC
1.000
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EP(C) BEH(C) PH(C) SRC(C) SOC(C) TEM(C) PRX(C) IDE
EP(C) 1.000
BEH(C) .693 1.000
.000
PH(C) .356 .249 1.000
.000 .000
SRC(C) .323 .332 .401 1.000
.000 .000 .000
SOC(C) .571 .438 .358 .263 1.000
.000 .000 .000 .000
TEM(C) .159 .101 .394 .45 .154 1.000
.006 .086 .000 .000 .009
PRX(C) -.230 -.289 -.009 -.266 -.209 -.022 1.000
.000 .000 .873 .000 .000 .714
IDE .088 .086 .018 .067 .005 -.062 -.080 1.000
.133 .142 .766 .258 .935 .292 .174
RLV -.111 -.189 .036 -.050 -.004 .088 .020 .050
.060 .001 .541 .402 .942 .139 .734 .402
CSV .161 .154 .006 .041 -.100 -.059 -.083 .176
.006 .009 .924 .495 .092 .325 .165 .003
RLG .083 .097 .018 .077 -.134 -.028 -.029 .170
.160 .100 .756 .195 .023 .640 .625 .004
ATT .012 .065 .027 -.012 .017 -.018 .054 .128
.838 .265 .644 .844 .768 .756 .356 .029
OVS .075 .025 .075 -.063 .021 -.065 -.006 .099
.201 .668 .205 .282 .719 .266 .925 .092
LIN .168 .057 .181 .052 .129 .059 -.017 .214
.004 .336 .002 .377 .028 .318 .770 .000
PRV -.112 -.141 -.114 -.137 -.067 -.024 .044 .006
.056 .016 .053 .020 .253 .682 .460 .919
BPR -.008 -.101 -.028 -.104 .010 -.065 .133 -.041
.890 .086 .629 .078 .870 .273 .024 .492
CFS .082 -.074 -.062 -.003 .042 -.093 .084 .023
.166 .206 .291 .963 .472 .113 .156 .700
IRS .083 .013 -.012 .021 .024 -.077 .007 .043
.159 .827 .832 .722 .680 .193 .909 .468
ASL .127 -.070 .033 .036 .049 .038 .022 .123
.03! .235 .579 .536 .409 .523 .706 .036
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EP(C) BEH(C) PH(C) SRC(C) SOC(C) TEM(C) PRX(C) IDE
ADX -.048 -.072 -.016 .029 -.008 .012 -.002 -.110
.416 .221 .785 .619 .897 .841 .972 .061
ASX -.092 -.106 .009 -.046 -.029 .036 -.020 -.173
.119 .073 .879 .440 .622 .538 .730 .003
AGE .014 .038 .043 -.014 -.021 -.057 .042 .109
.818 .520 .465 .819 .726 .331 .475 .064
EDU .004 .049 -.102 -.097 -.018 -.006 .050 -.177
.951 .409 .083 .098 .763 .925 .397 .002
INC -.119 -.064 -.095 -.183 -.009 -.043 .031 -.141
.053 .298 .122 .003 .878 .486 .610 .021
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RLV CSV RLG ATT OVS LIN PRV BPR
EP(A)
BEH(A)
PH(A)
SRC(A)
SOC(A)
TEM(A)
PRX(A)
IDE
RLV 1.000
CSV -.375 1.000
.000
RLG -.232 .625 1.000
.000 .000
ATT .095 -.010 .003 1.000
.108 .871 .962
OVS -.031 .078 .043 .183 1.000
.598 .188 .471 .002
LIN .097 -.055 .033 .116 .219 1.000
.100 .359 .582 .047 .000
PRV .114 .000 .109 -.074 .324 .261 1.000
.054 .998 .065 .211 .000 .000
BPR -.076 -.007 .036 .010 .389 .199 .459 1.000
.199 .907 .543 .869 .000 .001 .000
CFS -.056 .016 -.020 .019 .431 .148 .390 .637
.342 .795 .734 .745 .000 .011 .000 .000
IRS -.046 -.017 -.054 .055 .384 .259 .282 .451
.435 .775 .365 .352 .000 .000 .000 .000
ASL .069 -.061 -.028 .006 .299 .273 .262 .386
.241 .305 .642 .922 .000 .000 .000 .000
ADX -.071 .007 .074 -.103 .054 -.013 .063 .052
.228 .902 .208 .078 .360 .820 .282 .382
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RLV CSV RLG ATT OVS LIN PRV BPR
ASX .005 -.006 -.050 -.010 .066 -.065 .047 -.031
.938 .914 .393 .868 .266 .270 .429 .605
AGE -.085 .187 .108 .090 .145 -.062 .022 .154
.154 .002 .068 .126 .013 .294 .708 .009
EDU -.247 -.100 -.012 .033 .056 -.034 .039 .119
.000 .09! .843 .573 .337 .563 .503 .042
INC -.085 -.089 -.024 -.157 .058 -.135 .134 .118
.169 .152 .696 .010 .347 .027 .029 .054
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CFS IRS
EP(C)
BEH(C)
PH(C)
SRC(C)
SOC(C)
TEM(C)
PRX(C)
IDE
RLV
CSV
RLG
ATT
OVS
LIN
PRV
BPR
CFS 1.000
IRS .643 1.000
.000
ASL .445 .427
.000 .000
ADX .000 .046
.993 .439
ASL ADX ASX
1.000
.033 1.000
.382
AGE EDU INC
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CFS IRS ASL
ASX -.056 -.014 -.018
.340 .811 .761
AGE .130 .037 -.020
.027 .533 .734
EDU .077 -.028 -.016
.193 .632 .782
INC .072 .028 -.067
.242 .646 .274
ADX ASX AGE EDU
.457 1.000
.000
-.101 -.010 1.000
.087 .870
.105 .014 -.074 1.000
.074 .809 .208
.240 .110 -.021 .375
.000 .073 .730 .000
Legend
EP = Ethical perceptions
BEH = Behavioral intentions
PH = Probability of harm
SAC = Seriousness of consequences
SOC = Social consensus
TEM = Temporal immediacy
PRX = Proximity
IDE = Idealism
RLV = Relativism
CLV = Conservatism
RLG = Religiosity
ATT = Attitude about paying Federal income taxes
OVS = Creator of oversight board
LIN = Creators of fund for low income clinics
PRV = Extension of attorney/client privilege
BPR = Shift in burden of proof
CFS = IRS payment of costs and fees
IRS = IRS correspondence requirements
ASL = IRS audit selection criteria disclosure
ADX = Audit expectation
ASX = Additional assessment expectation
AGE = Age
EDU = Education
INC = Household income
INC
1.000
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L O U IS IA N A  T E C H
U N I V E R S I T Y
RESEARCH & GRADUATE SCHOOL
MEMORANDUM
TO: Thomas Phillips, Jr.
Michael Luehlfing 
Timothy Barnett
FROM: Deby Hamm, Graduate School
SUBJECT: HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW
DATE: July 20, 2000
In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed 
study entitled:
“An empirical analysis o f taxpayers' attitudes and behavioral intentions regarding compliance 
with federal income tax laws"
Proposal # 1 -TE
The proposed study procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate safeguards against 
possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may be personal in nature 
or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the privacy of the participants 
and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Further, the subjects must be informed that their 
participation is voluntary.
Since your reviewed project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use 
Committee grants approval of the involvement of human subjects as outlined.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects 
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct of the study and 
retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study.
If you have any questions, please give me a call at 257-2924.
_________________________________ A M E M B E R  OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUIS IA NA SYSTEM
r.O. BOX 7923 •  R U ST O N . LA 71272-0029 •  TELEPHONE (318) 257-2929 •  FAX (318) 257-4487 •  enial rcM»di«’ l.iiTrJi«lu
a n  l o i 'A i  o f f o a r v N i r y  u N t v i  u i n
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